管理工程学报
管理工程學報
관리공정학보
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
2013年
1期
171~177
,共null页
赵金实 段永瑞 王世进 霍佳震
趙金實 段永瑞 王世進 霍佳震
조금실 단영서 왕세진 곽가진
双渠道 承诺契约 主导权 代发货
雙渠道 承諾契約 主導權 代髮貨
쌍거도 승낙계약 주도권 대발화
dual-distribution channel; commitment contract; dominant position; drop shipping
当前传统零售商纷纷发展在线销售渠道并广泛采用供应商代发货的经营模式,这进一步增强了零售商的终端优势。以家电和快速消费品为代表的行业中,零售商正在逐步从生产商手中夺取主导权,零售商与供应商的关系受到供应链主导权位置的影响而变得更加复杂。本文针对这种复杂供应链现实问题,开发出包含承诺费的零售商双渠道协调机制,计算获得供应商主导和零售商主导两种不同情况下的供应链协调优化策略。通过对比供应商主导和零售商主导供应链的利润构成情况,我们发现供应链成员可以通过主导权为自己谋取更大利润;供应商主导型供应链的整体利润水平高于零售商主导型供应链。原因在于零售商使用主导权时激励供应商提高产量,又不完全确定自己的订购量,会导致供应商产生可能的缺货成本或产品过剩造成的浪费;零售商主导型供应链中供应商的产量更大。
噹前傳統零售商紛紛髮展在線銷售渠道併廣汎採用供應商代髮貨的經營模式,這進一步增彊瞭零售商的終耑優勢。以傢電和快速消費品為代錶的行業中,零售商正在逐步從生產商手中奪取主導權,零售商與供應商的關繫受到供應鏈主導權位置的影響而變得更加複雜。本文針對這種複雜供應鏈現實問題,開髮齣包含承諾費的零售商雙渠道協調機製,計算穫得供應商主導和零售商主導兩種不同情況下的供應鏈協調優化策略。通過對比供應商主導和零售商主導供應鏈的利潤構成情況,我們髮現供應鏈成員可以通過主導權為自己謀取更大利潤;供應商主導型供應鏈的整體利潤水平高于零售商主導型供應鏈。原因在于零售商使用主導權時激勵供應商提高產量,又不完全確定自己的訂購量,會導緻供應商產生可能的缺貨成本或產品過剩造成的浪費;零售商主導型供應鏈中供應商的產量更大。
당전전통령수상분분발전재선소수거도병엄범채용공응상대발화적경영모식,저진일보증강료령수상적종단우세。이가전화쾌속소비품위대표적행업중,령수상정재축보종생산상수중탈취주도권,령수상여공응상적관계수도공응련주도권위치적영향이변득경가복잡。본문침대저충복잡공응련현실문제,개발출포함승낙비적령수상쌍거도협조궤제,계산획득공응상주도화령수상주도량충불동정황하적공응련협조우화책략。통과대비공응상주도화령수상주도공응련적리윤구성정황,아문발현공응련성원가이통과주도권위자기모취경대리윤;공응상주도형공응련적정체리윤수평고우령수상주도형공응련。원인재우령수상사용주도권시격려공응상제고산량,우불완전학정자기적정구량,회도치공응상산생가능적결화성본혹산품과잉조성적낭비;령수상주도형공응련중공응상적산량경대。
It is a common practice for retailers to develop multiple channels to serve different customers. The retailers are competing for market dominance in many industries such as appliance and fast moving consumer goods. Internet shopping and drop shipping are two new trends in the retailing industry. This paper proposes that commitment contracts be established for both supplier-led and retailer- led supply chains from the perspective of supply chain management. In the supplier-led supply chain, if the retailer's order quantity achieves centralized level the profit of the supply chain can be maximized. In the retailer-led supply chain, the retailer can inspire the supplier to achieve optimal production quantity. The profit of a supply chain can also be maximized. We contrast two kinds of dominant positions and their corresponding solutions. Drop-shipping is a commonly adopted order fulfillment strategy for retailer's online distribution channel or part store-based channel. Because of the coexistence of store-based distribution network and web site distribution network, the retailer needs to prepare two kinds of inventories, its own inventory and the drop-shipping inventory. In addition to different dominant positions, the relationship between the retailer and the supplier becomes more complicated than' before. We consider a supply chain in which a supplier sells a product to a retailer. The retailer uses both physical stores and online channels to reach their final consumers. We research two kinds of supply chain structures: supplier-led supply chain and retailer-led supply chain. In the supplier-led supply chain, the supplier acts as the leader and the retailer as the follower. The supplier decides commitment fee and wholesale price of drop shipping to optimize profit for itself and the whole supply chain. The retailer only decides the order quantity for its own inventory and drop shipping inventory. The supplier produces according to the order quantity of retailer. In the retailer-led supply chain, the retailer decides the order quantity, commitment fee and wholesale price of drop shipping to optimize profit for itself and the whole supply chain, The supplier decides its production quantity. We assume that the drop shipper has no production capacity limit. We focus on such complicated dual channel and drop shipping supply chain. First, we consider the coordination in decentralized and centralized contexts. Second, we propose the commitment contracts for both supplier-led and retailer-led supply chain scenarios. We compare supplier-led supply chain with retailer-led supply chain. Our analysis shows that supply chain members can take advantage of dominant positions to receive more profit. The supplier can receive more profit in supplier-led supply chain than retailer-led supply chain. In contrast, the retailer receives more profit in retailer-led supply chain than supplier-led supply chain. Because of incentives from retailer, the production quantity of supplier in the retailer-led supply chain is greater than that in the supplier-led supply chain. This finding can help explain that dominant retailers usually lead to excess production capacity as observed in China.