CAJ | 학술논문

本文以1998～2007年在我国发生的国有控股上市公司控制权转移给民营部门的数据为样本，采用财务指标评估法中的因子分析方法，考察了控制权转移前一年到后三年（1997—2010）企业绩效的变化情况。研究发现，从控制权转移前后的企业绩效来看，在短期内样本企业的平均绩效有所提升，但在控制权转移一年后开始滑落，这种趋势一直延续至控制权转移后的第三年。可见，国有控股上市公司通过控制权转移而实现的民营化只在短期内改善了企业绩效，并没有真正提升企业的长期绩效，国有控股上市公司的控制权转移是无效率的。国有企业在控制权转移过程中需要对民营企业接管国有股权的动机和控制权私人收益的问题予以关注。
본문이1998～2007년재아국발생적국유공고상시공사공제권전이급민영부문적수거위양본，채용재무지표평고법중적인자분석방법，고찰료공제권전이전일년도후삼년（1997—2010）기업적효적변화정황。연구발현，종공제권전이전후적기업적효래간，재단기내양본기업적평균적효유소제승，단재공제권전이일년후개시활락，저충추세일직연속지공제권전이후적제삼년。가견，국유공고상시공사통과공제권전이이실현적민영화지재단기내개선료기업적효，병몰유진정제승기업적장기적효，국유공고상시공사적공제권전이시무효솔적。국유기업재공제권전이과정중수요대민영기업접관국유고권적동궤화공제권사인수익적문제여이관주。
Since 1980s, privatization policies have been implemented across various countries all over the world. Policy makers expect privatization could bring positive effects on firms＇ performance. Especially in the transition economies, larger privatization programs have been carried out, hence having a more profound effect on their national economies. Privatization is the transfer of ownership and control of property or businesses from the state to a privately owned entity. So, privatization and the transfer of SOE＇ s control rights are two aspects of the same issue. We classify privatization into two types, namely non-listed SOEs＇ privatization and state-owned listed companies＇ privatization. We focus on the listed one, since it＇ s the main form of implementing privatization today. Based on the thought of principal-agent theory, property right and transaction cost, different objective functions and competitive market environment, most economists conclude that privatization could reduce the agency cost, promote work incentives and improve firm performance. However, these studies ignore one important party involved in the process of privatization-private buyers. What＇ s their true purpose of taking over the public property, to stimulate the superior performance of the firm and gain their public benefits or to just obtain the private benefits of control？ By answering this question,we could therefore make an objective judgment on the efficiency of privatization in China. We assume that the benefits of control of the buyer（seller） can be written as αVb,s ＋ Bb,s ,where Vb,s is the level of public benefits of control generated by the buyer（seller） and Bb.s is the level of private benefits of control extracted by the buyer （seller）. α represents the fraction size of the block. When the buyer＇s expected benefits of control are larger than the seller＇ s,the buyer could have the desire to really make the purchase. Therefore,we have developed two hypotheses as follows： H1 ：The buyer＇ s public benefits of control are larger than the seller＇ s, Vb 〉 Vr Since the public benefits reflect the increase of the firm value due to the controlling shareholder＇ s participating in the corporate governance, under such hypothesis, after the transfer of the controlling right, firm＇ s value would be enhanced. However, the efficiency of the transfer could be different due to the divergence of the level of private benefits extracted by the buyer and the seller. If the private benefits of the buyer are smaller than those of the seller, the controlling right transfer could increase the firm＇ s value and reduce the level of private benefits. The privatization is with the Pareto Efficiency. And if the private benefits of the buyer are larger than those of the seller, the controlling right transfer could increase the firm＇ s value to some extent, yet not to its optimal level. The privatization is efficient, but if we control the level of the private benefits, the efficiency could be improved. H2 ：After the transfer of the controlling right, Firm＇ s value has not been enhanced, Vb ≤ Vs. Under such condition, we guess that obtaining the private benefit of control is private buyers＇ main purchase motive,and the privatization is inefficient. In our empirical studies, we try to measure the firm performance from the four aspects, namely, profitability, solvency, development ability and operational capability. Using a sample of 110 Chinese listed companies that have had controlling blocks transferred from the government to private owners during a period from 1998 to 2007, based on the factor analysis method, we examine the change in firm performance during a period of 5 years （from the year before the transfer to the 3rd year after this transfer）. Our findings are as follows： 1. After the controlling blocks have been transferred from one state entity to a private entity, there＇ s an increase in the average firm performance, but one year after the control transfers, the average performance begins to slump. Generally speaking, privatization by the means of controlling right transfer among listed companies doesn＇ t improve the firm performance in the long run, leading to the inefficiency of control transfer in China. 2. As the successful transfer demands that the buyer＇ s expected benefits of control are larger than the seller＇ s, we doubt that obtaining the private benefit of control is private buyers＇ main purchase motive. Private benefit of control negatively influences the future corporate performance. Therefore, to control the former could help to improve the latter, hence increasing the efficiency of privatization. Regarding to the measures to control the private benefits, the policymakers need to ensure the openness and fairness of the controlling right market, establish the sound legal environment and a strong supervision mechanism.