CAJ | 학술논문

创业企业普遍存在着资金短缺的问题，创业投资则有效解决了创业企业的融资困难．一旦投资者进入到创业活动中，项目要想成功就需要企业家和投资者付出一定的努力．此时投资者需要最优的融资契约，以此激励企业家付出高水平的努力，使自己的利润最大化．本文在努力水平事先隐藏且无法核实的前提下，通过建立一个两阶段的融资模型，得到了两份优化的融资契约．论文进一步表明，企业家努力的边际成本与投资预期净现值的相对大小是进行融资契约选择的关键影响因素，即当投资预期净现值相对于努力成本较小时，不存在可行的契约；当投资预期净现值相对于努力成本较大时，最优融资契约将以两种形式出现：不论第一期的利润额多少，第二阶段再融资概率都接近于1的（FC1）和根据第一期的利润额确定第二阶段再融资概率的（FC2）．由于双边道德风险的存在，无论投资者选择何种融资契约，都不会在投资的第二阶段与企业家共同努力．
창업기업보편존재착자금단결적문제，창업투자칙유효해결료창업기업적융자곤난．일단투자자진입도창업활동중，항목요상성공취수요기업가화투자자부출일정적노력．차시투자자수요최우적융자계약，이차격려기업가부출고수평적노력，사자기적리윤최대화．본문재노력수평사선은장차무법핵실적전제하，통과건립일개량계단적융자모형，득도료량빈우화적융자계약．논문진일보표명，기업가노력적변제성본여투자예기정현치적상대대소시진행융자계약선택적관건영향인소，즉당투자예기정현치상대우노력성본교소시，불존재가행적계약；당투자예기정현치상대우노력성본교대시，최우융자계약장이량충형식출현：불론제일기적리윤액다소，제이계단재융자개솔도접근우1적（FC1）화근거제일기적리윤액학정제이계단재융자개솔적（FC2）．유우쌍변도덕풍험적존재，무론투자자선택하충융자계약，도불회재투자적제이계단여기업가공동노력．
There are generally the problems of shortage of funds in enterprises, and venture capital is effective to solve their financing difficulties. Once investors enter into entrepreneurial activities, it needs entrepreneurs and investors to pay some effort to make the project successful. At this time the investor requires the optimal financial contract to induce the entrepreneur to choose high effort to maximize his profit. With hidden effort ex ante, this paper gets two optimization financing contracts by studying a two-period financing model. Further the paper states that the relative size of entrepreneurs＇ marginal cost of efforts and the expected net present value of investment is the key influencing factor for the choice of financing contracts. When the marginal cost of effort is relatively too high as compared to the expected NPV, then no feasible contracts will exist. But if exerting high effort is relatively less costly as compared to the expected NPV, the optimal financial contract will take two forms, which are （FC1） whose refinancing probabilities of the second stage are both set equal to 1 regardless of the first-period profit and （FC2） with the refinancing probabilities made contingent on the first-period profit. With the existence of double moral hazard, no matter the investor chooses which financing contract, he doesn＇t need to work together with entrepreneurs in the second stage of the investment.