管理学报
管理學報
관이학보
Chinese JOurnal of Management
2013年
4期
583~589
,共null页
逆向选择 道德风险 双向激励 供应链协调 虚拟第三方 委托代理
逆嚮選擇 道德風險 雙嚮激勵 供應鏈協調 虛擬第三方 委託代理
역향선택 도덕풍험 쌍향격려 공응련협조 허의제삼방 위탁대리
adverse selection; moral hazard; double incentives; supply chain coordination; virtual-third party; principal agent
在节点企业地位相当的二级供应链中,销售商隐藏努力行动、供应商隐藏成本信息,从而导致供应链效率低下。为此,运用委托代理理论,引入虚拟第三方为协调主体,从供应链整体利益最大化出发,对供应链进行集中控制、利润分配,对供应商和销售商实施双向激励。结果表明,与供应商主导供应链时的情形相比,当销售利润共享比例α*和成本共担比例β*满足更为苛刻的关系时,供应链才能实现协调。但是,此时的虚拟第三方承认了供应商的信息租金,其决策的角度是供应链期望利润的α*倍。最后,通过一个算例对研究结果进行了说明。
在節點企業地位相噹的二級供應鏈中,銷售商隱藏努力行動、供應商隱藏成本信息,從而導緻供應鏈效率低下。為此,運用委託代理理論,引入虛擬第三方為協調主體,從供應鏈整體利益最大化齣髮,對供應鏈進行集中控製、利潤分配,對供應商和銷售商實施雙嚮激勵。結果錶明,與供應商主導供應鏈時的情形相比,噹銷售利潤共享比例α*和成本共擔比例β*滿足更為苛刻的關繫時,供應鏈纔能實現協調。但是,此時的虛擬第三方承認瞭供應商的信息租金,其決策的角度是供應鏈期望利潤的α*倍。最後,通過一箇算例對研究結果進行瞭說明。
재절점기업지위상당적이급공응련중,소수상은장노역행동、공응상은장성본신식,종이도치공응련효솔저하。위차,운용위탁대리이론,인입허의제삼방위협조주체,종공응련정체이익최대화출발,대공응련진행집중공제、리윤분배,대공응상화소수상실시쌍향격려。결과표명,여공응상주도공응련시적정형상비,당소수리윤공향비례α*화성본공담비례β*만족경위가각적관계시,공응련재능실현협조。단시,차시적허의제삼방승인료공응상적신식조금,기결책적각도시공응련기망리윤적α*배。최후,통과일개산례대연구결과진행료설명。
In a two-stage supply chain,the supplier and retailer are equal in market power.The supplier hides its information about production cost and the retailer hides its action about sales effort,which results in low efficiency of supply chain operation.To cope with this problem,a virtual-third party is introduced to represent the whole interests of the supply chain as coordination main body.The virtual-third party realizes centralized control,profits distribution and double incentives.Main results reveal that compared to the situation in the retailer-led supply chain,only when the revenue sharing ratio and cost sharing proportion satisfies the more stringent constraint,the supply chain coordination could be achieved.However,because the virtual third-party admits the supplier's information rent,it made decision on how many times of the whole supply chain's expected profit.Finally,the study results are illustrated by a numerical example.