西安交通大学学报：社会科学版
西安交通大學學報：社會科學版
서안교통대학학보：사회과학판
Journal of Xi'an Jiaotong University(Social Sciences)
2013年
2期
63~68
,共null页
收费公路 规模经济 合作效应 联盟治理结构 利益分配
收費公路 規模經濟 閤作效應 聯盟治理結構 利益分配
수비공로 규모경제 합작효응 련맹치리결구 이익분배
toll - roads ; scale economy ; cooperating effects; structure of alliance; interest distribution
针对西部落后地区收费公路规模经济性差、产业经济绩效低下的现状，提出落后地区收费公路实行跨行政区域联盟以达到规模经济进而提高产业绩效的设想，并对这一设想的可行性进行了系统性的论证。首先，从联盟绩效评价的角度构建收费公路跨行政区域联盟的整体目标函数，对联盟合作效应进行分析与验证；其次，模拟收费公路运营单位缔结战略性联盟的演化过程，认为不涉及股权变动的契约型联盟方式是跨行政区域联盟获得合作优势的最优治理结构，并进一步通过数理分析归纳收费公路产业内联盟结构与联盟绩效之间的关联；之后，构建联盟和收费公路运营单位的净收益函数，验证跨行政区域联盟的利益协同机制；最后，通过推算参与联盟的收费公路运营单位的利益分享系数，验证联盟在纳什均衡下的利益分配机制。
針對西部落後地區收費公路規模經濟性差、產業經濟績效低下的現狀，提齣落後地區收費公路實行跨行政區域聯盟以達到規模經濟進而提高產業績效的設想，併對這一設想的可行性進行瞭繫統性的論證。首先，從聯盟績效評價的角度構建收費公路跨行政區域聯盟的整體目標函數，對聯盟閤作效應進行分析與驗證；其次，模擬收費公路運營單位締結戰略性聯盟的縯化過程，認為不涉及股權變動的契約型聯盟方式是跨行政區域聯盟穫得閤作優勢的最優治理結構，併進一步通過數理分析歸納收費公路產業內聯盟結構與聯盟績效之間的關聯；之後，構建聯盟和收費公路運營單位的淨收益函數，驗證跨行政區域聯盟的利益協同機製；最後，通過推算參與聯盟的收費公路運營單位的利益分享繫數，驗證聯盟在納什均衡下的利益分配機製。
침대서부락후지구수비공로규모경제성차、산업경제적효저하적현상，제출락후지구수비공로실행과행정구역련맹이체도규모경제진이제고산업적효적설상，병대저일설상적가행성진행료계통성적론증。수선，종련맹적효평개적각도구건수비공로과행정구역련맹적정체목표함수，대련맹합작효응진행분석여험증；기차，모의수비공로운영단위체결전략성련맹적연화과정，인위불섭급고권변동적계약형련맹방식시과행정구역련맹획득합작우세적최우치리결구，병진일보통과수리분석귀납수비공로산업내련맹결구여련맹적효지간적관련；지후，구건련맹화수비공로운영단위적정수익함수，험증과행정구역련맹적이익협동궤제；최후，통과추산삼여련맹적수비공로운영단위적이익분향계수，험증련맹재납십균형하적이익분배궤제。
Aiming at the status quo that current insufficient scale economy and poor economic performance of the tollroad industry in less developed west regions, this paper proposes an envisage to form an alliance across administrative regions in order to attain scale economy and then improve overall economic performance. Furthermore, the feasibility of argumentation is made systematically. First, the overall objective function of the toll-road alliance across administrative regions is constructed from the viewpoints of the evaluation of the performance of the alliance to analyze and verify the cooperating effects of the alliance. Second, the evolution process of the forming of strategic alliance of the toll - road operating units is simulated, considering that the contract alliance mode not involving stock change is the optimal governing structure for the alliance across administrative regions to achieve the cooperation priority. Moreover, the correlation between the alliance structure in the toll -road industry and the alliance performance is induced using the mathematical analysis. Third, the net income function of the alliance and the toll - road units is constructed to confirm the interest collaboration mechanism of the alliance across administrative regions. Finally, the interest distribution mechanism of the alliance under the Nash equilibrium is verified by calculating the interest sharing coefficient of the toll - road operating units participating in the alliance.
