CAJ | 학술논문

在供应链联合促销中，双边道德风险的存在使得供应商和销售商双方都有强烈的“搭便车”激励，而合理的利益分配对促进合作双方积极投入具有重要作用．运用纳什谈判解，构造了供应链联合促销的相互激励模型，并考察了最优线性合约的存在性．研究表明：在合作能产生净剩余的条件下，存在最优的批发价格使渠道收益达到极大；尽管谈判能力对最优批发价格没有影响，但合作收益在双方之间的分配却依赖于各自具有的谈判能力．研究指出：各方分得的合作剩余与自身的谈判能力成正比，与对方的谈判能力成反比．
재공응련연합촉소중，쌍변도덕풍험적존재사득공응상화소수상쌍방도유강렬적“탑편차”격려，이합리적이익분배대촉진합작쌍방적겁투입구유중요작용．운용납십담판해，구조료공응련연합촉소적상호격려모형，병고찰료최우선성합약적존재성．연구표명：재합작능산생정잉여적조건하，존재최우적비발개격사거도수익체도겁대；진관담판능력대최우비발개격몰유영향，단합작수익재쌍방지간적분배각의뢰우각자구유적담판능력．연구지출：각방분득적합작잉여여자신적담판능력성정비，여대방적담판능력성반비．
In joint sale promotion of supply chains, the supplier and retailer have a strong incentive of ＂free riding＂ due to double moral hazard. It is helpful of the reasonable profit sharing rule to promote active inputs of both parties. By means of Nash bargaining concept, it established mutually incentive model and investigated existence of the optimal linear contract for supply chains joint promotion. It shows that the optimal wholesale price exists on the condition of existence of net cooperative residual and the bargaining powers, on which the allocation of net residual depends, have no impact on the optimal wholesale price. What＇s more, it points out that the ratio of net cooperative residuals acquired by the two parties is in proportion to the ratio of bargaining power factors.