CAJ | 학술논문

文章研究了新会计准则实施后上市公司的盈余管理行为,以及高管薪酬如何受到盈余管理后的盈余影响,发现公司普遍通过投资收益进行盈余管理,投资收益显著提高高管薪酬水平。进一步研究了股权结构对盈余管理行为和薪酬业绩敏感度的影响,结果表明国有控股、股权集中的公司盈余管理程度和高管薪酬业绩敏感度低于非国有控股、股权分散的公司。说明国有控股、股权集中的公司可以有效抑制管理层的盈余管理行为,但是对薪酬业绩敏感度没有治理作用。
문장연구료신회계준칙실시후상시공사적영여관리행위,이급고관신수여하수도영여관리후적영여영향,발현공사보편통과투자수익진행영여관리,투자수익현저제고고관신수수평。진일보연구료고권결구대영여관리행위화신수업적민감도적영향,결과표명국유공고、고권집중적공사영여관리정도화고관신수업적민감도저우비국유공고、고권분산적공사。설명국유공고、고권집중적공사가이유효억제관리층적영여관리행위,단시대신수업적민감도몰유치리작용。
This paper researches on the earnings management of Chinese listed companies after the application of new accounting rules,and how the earnings after earnings management influence the top executives compensation.The result suggests that there is a widespread earnings management through investment income among companies and investment income significantly improves the level of top executives compensation.In addition,this paper researches on the effect of shareholding structure on the earnings management and pay-performance sensitivity.The result also suggests that the degrees of earnings management and pay-performance sensitivity in state control and shareholder concentration companies are much lower than those in non-state control and shareholder dispersion companies.State control and shareholder concentration companies can restrain the earnings management,but can not improve pay-performance sensitivity.