CAJ | 학술논문

中国IPO新股发行市场排队上市和二级市场持续下跌形成鲜明对比。在IPO发行市场上，高发行价格和高IPO抑价率并存，表明中国IPO发行市场相对低效并且价格发现功能严重不足。本文运用Djankov等（2003）以及Shleifer（2005）建立的分析股票市场监管执行机制的理论框架，分析了中国保荐人制度在结合市场自律和政府监管的同时，缺乏法院诉讼机制的问题。而进一步的实证研究表明，在缺乏法院诉讼机制的条件下，证监会对保荐人的责任处罚并没有影响该保荐人所在证券公司承销股票发行的IPO折价率，也没有影响受处罚证券公司收取的承销及保荐费率。在理论与实证分析的基础上，本文讨论了保荐人制度失效的原因，并提出发行审核制度的改革建议。
중국IPO신고발행시장배대상시화이급시장지속하질형성선명대비。재IPO발행시장상，고발행개격화고IPO억개솔병존，표명중국IPO발행시장상대저효병차개격발현공능엄중불족。본문운용Djankov등（2003）이급Shleifer（2005）건립적분석고표시장감관집행궤제적이론광가，분석료중국보천인제도재결합시장자률화정부감관적동시，결핍법원소송궤제적문제。이진일보적실증연구표명，재결핍법원소송궤제적조건하，증감회대보천인적책임처벌병몰유영향해보천인소재증권공사승소고표발행적IPO절개솔，야몰유영향수처벌증권공사수취적승소급보천비솔。재이론여실증분석적기출상，본문토론료보천인제도실효적원인，병제출발행심핵제도적개혁건의。
The enthusiasm of companies on the waiting list for IPO approval stands in sharp contrast to the gloomy secondary market. The high issuing price, together with the high under-pricing rate of the IPO is a distinc-tive characteristic of China＇ s IPO market. This indicates that the IPO market in China is relatively inefficient and has flaws in its price discovery function. This paper applies the enforcement theory of regulation established by Djankov et al （2003） and Shleifer （2005） to the issue of China＇ s sponsorship regime, and finds that though the regime combines the market and government regulations, it lacks a channel for lawsuit. Further empirical analyses find that the administrative penalties imposed by CSRC have no direct impact on the security companies where the sponsor is punished; the subsequent IPO under-pricing rate sponsored by the penalized security companies as well as the gross spreads taken is unaffected compared to other unpunished companies. Based on both theoretical and empirical analyses, this paper discusses the reasons why the sponsorship regime fails, and proposes policy sugges-tions for the reform of the security issuance examination mechanism.