金融研究
金融研究
금융연구
Journal of Financial Research
2013年
3期
15~29
,共null页
资源错配 政治周期 官员激励
資源錯配 政治週期 官員激勵
자원착배 정치주기 관원격려
Resource misallocation; Political cycles; Incentives of local officials
本文利用1998~2007年中国工业企业数据和地级层面的官员数据,旨在从实证角度研究中国制造业的资源错配程度与地方党代会周期之间的内在关系。利用Hsieh and Klenow(2009)关于制造业资源错配程度的测度,我们发现,在省级党代会召开的当年和后两年,地级行政区的资源错配程度显著较高,在接下来的两年有所降低。我们的分析还显示,资源错配的党代会周期效应分别在国有企业密集度、产业关联效应度高或资本密集度高的行业表现更为明显。这些经验证据说明地方官员的晋升激励虽然有助于促进地区GDP增长,但与此同时也可能对地区的资源配置效率产生负面影响。
本文利用1998~2007年中國工業企業數據和地級層麵的官員數據,旨在從實證角度研究中國製造業的資源錯配程度與地方黨代會週期之間的內在關繫。利用Hsieh and Klenow(2009)關于製造業資源錯配程度的測度,我們髮現,在省級黨代會召開的噹年和後兩年,地級行政區的資源錯配程度顯著較高,在接下來的兩年有所降低。我們的分析還顯示,資源錯配的黨代會週期效應分彆在國有企業密集度、產業關聯效應度高或資本密集度高的行業錶現更為明顯。這些經驗證據說明地方官員的晉升激勵雖然有助于促進地區GDP增長,但與此同時也可能對地區的資源配置效率產生負麵影響。
본문이용1998~2007년중국공업기업수거화지급층면적관원수거,지재종실증각도연구중국제조업적자원착배정도여지방당대회주기지간적내재관계。이용Hsieh and Klenow(2009)관우제조업자원착배정도적측도,아문발현,재성급당대회소개적당년화후량년,지급행정구적자원착배정도현저교고,재접하래적량년유소강저。아문적분석환현시,자원착배적당대회주기효응분별재국유기업밀집도、산업관련효응도고혹자본밀집도고적행업표현경위명현。저사경험증거설명지방관원적진승격려수연유조우촉진지구GDP증장,단여차동시야가능대지구적자원배치효솔산생부면영향。
Using a large dataset of manufacturing firms and local officials during 1998 - 2007, this paper investigates the empirical relationship between resource misallocation in the manufacturing sector and the timing of local Party Congress in China. Exploiting the measure of industrial - level resource misallocation proposed by Hsieh and Klenow (2009), we find that the manufacturing misallocation significantly increases in the Party Congress year and the subsequent two years, and decreases in the other two years. This relationship between misallocation and political cycles becomes more pronounced for industries with higher concentration of state - owned enterprises, capital - intensive firms or industries with strong linkage effects. This evidence suggests that while the promotion incentive of local officials in China may induce high GDP growth, it also generates negative impacts on allocative efficiency.