金融研究
金融研究
금융연구
Journal of Financial Research
2013年
3期
130~142
,共null页
拉闸限电 地方干部考核评价机制 股权性质 政治关系
拉閘限電 地方榦部攷覈評價機製 股權性質 政治關繫
랍갑한전 지방간부고핵평개궤제 고권성질 정치관계
Electric power cutting, Local cadre assessment mechanism; Firm's ownership; Political connection
2010年是我国实现“十一五”所规划的万元GDP能耗下降20%目标的收官之年,各地方由于完不成节能减排任务,纷纷对企业进行“拉闸限电”。我们以河北、山西、河南、内蒙古四省的有色金属行业为样本,研究了所有权性质、民营企业政治关系对地方政府拉闸限电行为的影响,并对比分析了不同企业被限电的经济后果。结果表明,地方政府官员在一票否决的强激励考核评价机制下,对高耗能的有色金属行业实行了普遍的限电措施。国有企业被拉闸限电时间要显著少于民营企业,说明存在事实上的所有制歧视。具有政治关系的民营企业比不具有政治关系的民营企业被拉闸限电的概率更低,时间更短。民营企业相对于国有企业、无政治关系的民营企业相对于有政治关系的民营企业在拉闸限电后,销售收入和总(净)资产利润率下降幅度更大。
2010年是我國實現“十一五”所規劃的萬元GDP能耗下降20%目標的收官之年,各地方由于完不成節能減排任務,紛紛對企業進行“拉閘限電”。我們以河北、山西、河南、內矇古四省的有色金屬行業為樣本,研究瞭所有權性質、民營企業政治關繫對地方政府拉閘限電行為的影響,併對比分析瞭不同企業被限電的經濟後果。結果錶明,地方政府官員在一票否決的彊激勵攷覈評價機製下,對高耗能的有色金屬行業實行瞭普遍的限電措施。國有企業被拉閘限電時間要顯著少于民營企業,說明存在事實上的所有製歧視。具有政治關繫的民營企業比不具有政治關繫的民營企業被拉閘限電的概率更低,時間更短。民營企業相對于國有企業、無政治關繫的民營企業相對于有政治關繫的民營企業在拉閘限電後,銷售收入和總(淨)資產利潤率下降幅度更大。
2010년시아국실현“십일오”소규화적만원GDP능모하강20%목표적수관지년,각지방유우완불성절능감배임무,분분대기업진행“랍갑한전”。아문이하북、산서、하남、내몽고사성적유색금속행업위양본,연구료소유권성질、민영기업정치관계대지방정부랍갑한전행위적영향,병대비분석료불동기업피한전적경제후과。결과표명,지방정부관원재일표부결적강격려고핵평개궤제하,대고모능적유색금속행업실행료보편적한전조시。국유기업피랍갑한전시간요현저소우민영기업,설명존재사실상적소유제기시。구유정치관계적민영기업비불구유정치관계적민영기업피랍갑한전적개솔경저,시간경단。민영기업상대우국유기업、무정치관계적민영기업상대우유정치관계적민영기업재랍갑한전후,소수수입화총(정)자산리윤솔하강폭도경대。
The year of 2010 was the last year of the Eleventh Five - year Plan in which energy consumption for unit GDP production should he reduced by 20%. Some Local governments which could not reach this target had to stop supplying electric power to firms. We made an investigation to firms in non -ferrous metals industry in four provinces including Hebei, Shanxi, Henan and Inner Mongolia. On the basis of analyzing the institutional root of electric - power - cutting (EPC) , we study the effect of firm's ownership and the political connection of private enterprises on the local governments' EPC behavior and its economic consequences. The empirical re- sults show that bearing the high pressure of One - vote Veto, the local government officials adopted the EPC in the non - ferrous metals industry at the end of 2010. The time of electric power - cutting ( TEPC ) of state - owned enterprises is less than the private enterprises. In private enterprises, TEPC of those with political connections is less than those without political connections. This result supports that there is significant ownership discrimination for private enterprises. Lastly, we find the negative shock of EPC is greater for the private enterprises, especially for the non political - connected private enterprises.