金融研究
金融研究
금융연구
Journal of Financial Research
2013年
4期
71~84
,共null页
马君潞 郭牧炫 李泽广
馬君潞 郭牧炫 李澤廣
마군로 곽목현 리택엄
银行竞争 借款期限结构 客户争夺效应 代理成本效应
銀行競爭 藉款期限結構 客戶爭奪效應 代理成本效應
은행경쟁 차관기한결구 객호쟁탈효응 대리성본효응
Bank competition, Loan maturity structure, Competing for customer effect, Agency cost effect
本文研究了银行竞争对大型企业借款期限结构的影响,通过构建委托代理模型,细分了银行竞争对企业借款期限结构存在的双重效应——“客户争夺效应”和“代理成本效应”。前者激励银行对优质客户展开争夺,将延长贷款期限作为竞争手段之一;后者则增加了银行的代理成本,缩短了企业的借款期限。采用1998—2007年上市公司的经验数据证实,银行竞争对借款期限的影响主要由“代理成本效应”的强弱决定,该效应越强的地区,上市公司获得的借款期限越短;不同地区银行竞争的“代理成本效应”和“客户争夺效应”相对强弱不尽相同,法律制度越好、政府干预企业越少的地区,“代理成本效应”较弱。
本文研究瞭銀行競爭對大型企業藉款期限結構的影響,通過構建委託代理模型,細分瞭銀行競爭對企業藉款期限結構存在的雙重效應——“客戶爭奪效應”和“代理成本效應”。前者激勵銀行對優質客戶展開爭奪,將延長貸款期限作為競爭手段之一;後者則增加瞭銀行的代理成本,縮短瞭企業的藉款期限。採用1998—2007年上市公司的經驗數據證實,銀行競爭對藉款期限的影響主要由“代理成本效應”的彊弱決定,該效應越彊的地區,上市公司穫得的藉款期限越短;不同地區銀行競爭的“代理成本效應”和“客戶爭奪效應”相對彊弱不儘相同,法律製度越好、政府榦預企業越少的地區,“代理成本效應”較弱。
본문연구료은행경쟁대대형기업차관기한결구적영향,통과구건위탁대리모형,세분료은행경쟁대기업차관기한결구존재적쌍중효응——“객호쟁탈효응”화“대리성본효응”。전자격려은행대우질객호전개쟁탈,장연장대관기한작위경쟁수단지일;후자칙증가료은행적대리성본,축단료기업적차관기한。채용1998—2007년상시공사적경험수거증실,은행경쟁대차관기한적영향주요유“대리성본효응”적강약결정,해효응월강적지구,상시공사획득적차관기한월단;불동지구은행경쟁적“대리성본효응”화“객호쟁탈효응”상대강약불진상동,법률제도월호、정부간예기업월소적지구,“대리성본효응”교약。
In this paper, we analyze the effects of bank competition on loan maturity structure by using a princi- pal - agent model and decomposing double effects of bank competition on loan maturity structure of large enter- prises as ' competing for customer effect' and ' agency cost effect'. The former one stimulates banks to compete for quality customers by extending the maturity of borrowing as competition strategy; the latter one increase the agency cost making banks shorten the maturity of borrowing of firms. Based on the data of listed companies from 1998 to 2007, we find that the effects of bank competition on loan term structure is mainly dominated by the ' a- gency cost effect' , more significant agency cost with shorter maturity of borrowings of listed companies. The rel- ative intensity of "agency cost effect" and ' competing for customer effect' varies for different reg/ons. That means the ' agency cost effect' is comparatively weak in the regions with better legal institutions and less gov- ernment intervention.