CAJ | 학술논문

中小企业在融资的过程中会遇到一系列问题，最重要的决策问题为是否向银行借款，本文通过建立演化博弈模型对企业与银行之间的博弈进行了模拟，得出双方同时有意愿与对方合作（借款和贷款）或者同时不具有意愿与对方合作的两个稳定策略。博弈最终状态的确定由双方预期收益及初始博弈策略选择的状态决定。文章同时简要介绍了一系列可以使得系统朝着期望演化稳定策略收敛的措施，给予银行和企业及宏观调控些许指导。
중소기업재융자적과정중회우도일계렬문제，최중요적결책문제위시부향은행차관，본문통과건립연화박혁모형대기업여은행지간적박혁진행료모의，득출쌍방동시유의원여대방합작（차관화대관）혹자동시불구유의원여대방합작적량개은정책략。박혁최종상태적학정유쌍방예기수익급초시박혁책략선택적상태결정。문장동시간요개소료일계렬가이사득계통조착기망연화은정책략수렴적조시，급여은행화기업급굉관조공사허지도。
SMEs（the small and medium enterprises） in the process of financing will encounter a series of problems, whether borrowing or not from the banks is the most important decision-making problem, with the model of the Evolutionary Game Theory between SMEs and banks, we can draw two ESS（Evotutionary Stable Strategy） ,that is the players of the two sides in the game have the mutual willingness to cooperate with each other at the same time （borrowing and lending） or refuse to cooperate with each other. The final state of the game is determined by the expected return of the two sides and the initial state of the strategies selected by the players. The article also briefly describes a series of measures those let the system obtain the expected convergence of the evolutionary stable strategy; it also provides the banks, the enterprises and the macro-control of government some advices.