国际贸易问题
國際貿易問題
국제무역문제
Journal of International Trade
2013年
5期
128~142
,共null页
控制权 控制权偏离 企业规模 并购规模 并购绩效
控製權 控製權偏離 企業規模 併購規模 併購績效
공제권 공제권편리 기업규모 병구규모 병구적효
Control right; Control right deviation; Enterprise scale; M&Ascale; M&A performance
微观层面上,有关“国进民退”与“国退民进”的利弊之争核心在于控制权性质不同的企业是否具有不同的“趋利避害”能力。本文从控制权和规模扩张来剖析“趋利避害”的具体表现,研究其影响并购绩效的路径和机制。研究发现:(1)终极控制人在企业并购中存在支持与掏空行为;(2)随着规模扩张,企业并没有获得规模、范围经济以及垄断势力带来的混合正向效应;(3)相对于政府控制,非政府终极控制人具有较强的掏空能力(趋利),和降低规模、范围不经济和无明显的垄断势力的负面影响能力(避害)。本文研究价值在于,理论上发展了不同性质的控制人在价值分配(掏空)、价值转移(市场势力)和价值创造(规模、范围经济)上的能力差异;实践上,能够为监管层政策制定、实施与评估提供相应经验支持。
微觀層麵上,有關“國進民退”與“國退民進”的利弊之爭覈心在于控製權性質不同的企業是否具有不同的“趨利避害”能力。本文從控製權和規模擴張來剖析“趨利避害”的具體錶現,研究其影響併購績效的路徑和機製。研究髮現:(1)終極控製人在企業併購中存在支持與掏空行為;(2)隨著規模擴張,企業併沒有穫得規模、範圍經濟以及壟斷勢力帶來的混閤正嚮效應;(3)相對于政府控製,非政府終極控製人具有較彊的掏空能力(趨利),和降低規模、範圍不經濟和無明顯的壟斷勢力的負麵影響能力(避害)。本文研究價值在于,理論上髮展瞭不同性質的控製人在價值分配(掏空)、價值轉移(市場勢力)和價值創造(規模、範圍經濟)上的能力差異;實踐上,能夠為鑑管層政策製定、實施與評估提供相應經驗支持。
미관층면상,유관“국진민퇴”여“국퇴민진”적리폐지쟁핵심재우공제권성질불동적기업시부구유불동적“추리피해”능력。본문종공제권화규모확장래부석“추리피해”적구체표현,연구기영향병구적효적로경화궤제。연구발현:(1)종겁공제인재기업병구중존재지지여도공행위;(2)수착규모확장,기업병몰유획득규모、범위경제이급롱단세력대래적혼합정향효응;(3)상대우정부공제,비정부종겁공제인구유교강적도공능력(추리),화강저규모、범위불경제화무명현적롱단세력적부면영향능력(피해)。본문연구개치재우,이론상발전료불동성질적공제인재개치분배(도공)、개치전이(시장세력)화개치창조(규모、범위경제)상적능력차이;실천상,능구위감관층정책제정、실시여평고제공상응경험지지。
Microscopically, the answering crux of the controversy over "ex-panding the public sector while retrenching the private" or its contrary lies in whether enterprises of different attributes in control rights are possessed of "abil-ities to draw on advantages and avoid disadvantages". From the control right and scale expansion viewpoint, this paper dives into such abilities of enterprise in a bid to study their impact pathway and mechanism on M&A performance. As the findings suggest, firstly, in M&A processes, propping and tunneling behav-iors are found on ultimate controllers; secondly, along with the scale expansion, the enterprise does not obtain positive mixed effect from the combination of econ-omies of scale and scope and monopoly; thirdly, as opposed to governmental con-trois, private ultimate controllers enjoy stronger tunneling ability (ability to utilize advantages) and negative abilities resulted from economies of non-scale and non-scope and absence of significant monopoly power (ability to avoid disadvan-tages). This paper claims value by presenting the theoretical disparities in abili-ties of controllers of varied attributes in terms of value distribution (tunneling), value transfer (market force) and value creation (economies of scale and scope). The present study also provides practical support for regulators to refer to when formulating, implementing and evaluating policies.