华东经济管理
華東經濟管理
화동경제관리
East China Economic Management
2013年
5期
159~163
,共null页
资本农场 农场所有权 专用性资产 制度成本 讨价还价
資本農場 農場所有權 專用性資產 製度成本 討價還價
자본농장 농장소유권 전용성자산 제도성본 토개환개
capital farms; farm ownership; specific asserts; institutional costs; bargaining
根据TCE和GHM理论，应该将农场所有权界定给专用性资产投资人，以监督其他契约方机会主义行为。因此，应该选择资本农场。然而。资本农场无法准确计量雇佣劳动边际贡献，具有较高雇佣交易成本。依Hansmann企业所有权理论，资本农场制度成本较高而制度效率较低。因此，按照效率原则，应该淘汰资本农场。现实中，资本市场处于求大于供非出清状态，而劳动市场处于供大于求非出清状态，造成农场更加依赖于资本而非劳动。根据卢周来讨价还价模型，相对劳动，资本具有较高讨价还价能力，从而拥有农场所有权。因此，存在一定数量资本农场。
根據TCE和GHM理論，應該將農場所有權界定給專用性資產投資人，以鑑督其他契約方機會主義行為。因此，應該選擇資本農場。然而。資本農場無法準確計量僱傭勞動邊際貢獻，具有較高僱傭交易成本。依Hansmann企業所有權理論，資本農場製度成本較高而製度效率較低。因此，按照效率原則，應該淘汰資本農場。現實中，資本市場處于求大于供非齣清狀態，而勞動市場處于供大于求非齣清狀態，造成農場更加依賴于資本而非勞動。根據盧週來討價還價模型，相對勞動，資本具有較高討價還價能力，從而擁有農場所有權。因此，存在一定數量資本農場。
근거TCE화GHM이론，응해장농장소유권계정급전용성자산투자인，이감독기타계약방궤회주의행위。인차，응해선택자본농장。연이。자본농장무법준학계량고용노동변제공헌，구유교고고용교역성본。의Hansmann기업소유권이론，자본농장제도성본교고이제도효솔교저。인차，안조효솔원칙，응해도태자본농장。현실중，자본시장처우구대우공비출청상태，이노동시장처우공대우구비출청상태，조성농장경가의뢰우자본이비노동。근거로주래토개환개모형，상대노동，자본구유교고토개환개능력，종이옹유농장소유권。인차，존재일정수량자본농장。
According to TCE and GHM theory, farms should give its ownership to its investors of the specific assets, so as to oversee the opportunistic behavior of the other contracting parties. Hence they should become the capital farms. However, the capital farms could not accurately measure the marginal contribution of each farmer employed. Based on the Hansmann corpo- rate ownership theory, they have higher labor transaction costs. It resulted in higher institutional costs and lower institutional effi- ciency. Therefore, in accordance with the principle of efficiency, the capital farms should fall into disuse. In reality, capital mar- kets were almost in the non-clearing states of demand exceeding supply, while labor markets were in the non-clearing states of oversupply. On Lu Zhoulai bargaining model, relative to the labor, the capital had a higher bargaining power, which made it hold the farm ownership. Therefore, there are a certain amount of capital farms in reality.
