工业技术经济
工業技術經濟
공업기술경제
Industrial Technology & Economy
2013年
4期
68~77
,共null页
集群联盟 竞合行为 演化博弈 空间结构 群体行为 仿真实验
集群聯盟 競閤行為 縯化博弈 空間結構 群體行為 倣真實驗
집군련맹 경합행위 연화박혁 공간결구 군체행위 방진실험
clustering alliances; co- opetition behavior; evolutionary game; spatial structure; group behaviors; simulation experiment
将企业间竞争与合作的微观个体行为与集群联盟的宏观群体行为特征联系起来,探讨两者间的关系。而从该视角定量分析的文献目前鲜为少见。首先依据演化动力产生的根源将集群联盟群体行为分为市场自组织行为和政府控制干预下的行为。接着基于多Agent数值仿真实验的研究方法,通过企业间竞争与合作的重复囚徒困境博弈试验,对集群联盟群体行为的演化进行了深刻的剖析,研究结果表明：在其他条件不变的前提下,不合作者的诱惑得益、企业合作者密度、企业邻域结构、企业空间密度这4个因素与集群联盟群体行为分别呈负向、无、正向、正向相关关系;亦分析了集群联盟群体行为在空间结构上的演化趋势,并且相同的企业往往集中在某几个特定的空间区域,形成团簇,合作者团簇越大,合作伙伴间的关系越稳固。最后在此基础上分别从市场和政府层面给出了具体的对策和建议。
將企業間競爭與閤作的微觀箇體行為與集群聯盟的宏觀群體行為特徵聯繫起來,探討兩者間的關繫。而從該視角定量分析的文獻目前鮮為少見。首先依據縯化動力產生的根源將集群聯盟群體行為分為市場自組織行為和政府控製榦預下的行為。接著基于多Agent數值倣真實驗的研究方法,通過企業間競爭與閤作的重複囚徒睏境博弈試驗,對集群聯盟群體行為的縯化進行瞭深刻的剖析,研究結果錶明：在其他條件不變的前提下,不閤作者的誘惑得益、企業閤作者密度、企業鄰域結構、企業空間密度這4箇因素與集群聯盟群體行為分彆呈負嚮、無、正嚮、正嚮相關關繫;亦分析瞭集群聯盟群體行為在空間結構上的縯化趨勢,併且相同的企業往往集中在某幾箇特定的空間區域,形成糰簇,閤作者糰簇越大,閤作夥伴間的關繫越穩固。最後在此基礎上分彆從市場和政府層麵給齣瞭具體的對策和建議。
장기업간경쟁여합작적미관개체행위여집군련맹적굉관군체행위특정련계기래,탐토량자간적관계。이종해시각정량분석적문헌목전선위소견。수선의거연화동력산생적근원장집군련맹군체행위분위시장자조직행위화정부공제간예하적행위。접착기우다Agent수치방진실험적연구방법,통과기업간경쟁여합작적중복수도곤경박혁시험,대집군련맹군체행위적연화진행료심각적부석,연구결과표명：재기타조건불변적전제하,불합작자적유혹득익、기업합작자밀도、기업린역결구、기업공간밀도저4개인소여집군련맹군체행위분별정부향、무、정향、정향상관관계;역분석료집군련맹군체행위재공간결구상적연화추세,병차상동적기업왕왕집중재모궤개특정적공간구역,형성단족,합작자단족월대,합작화반간적관계월은고。최후재차기출상분별종시장화정부층면급출료구체적대책화건의。
It links the microscopic individual behavior of co - opetltion among enterprises and the macroscopic group behaviors characteristics d clustering alliances, discusses the relationship between the two. However, it is scarcely seem to quantitatively discuss frem this perspective. First according to the root causes of the evolution power, the group behaviors of clustering alliances are divided into the behaviors of market self- organizational and the behaviors in the control and intervention of government. Then bases on Multi - Agent nu merical simulation experimental method, it carries a deep analysis on the evolution of group behaviors of clustering alliances through the iterated prisoner＇s dilenrna game experiment of the behavior of co - opetition mnong enterprises. With other conditions remaining unchanged, research result shows that group behaviors of clustering alliances are negatively correlated with temptation payoff of ddectors, uncorrelated with corporate collaberators density, positively correlated with enterprise neighborhood structure and pesitively correlated with the enterprise space density. It also analyzes the evolution trend of group behaviors of clustering alliances in the spatial structure, and the same enterprise tends to be concentrated in a few specific spatial region and then formed clusters. The larger the collaborators cluster, the more stable of relationship among partners. Finally in this basis, respectively from the market and the government level it gives some specific countermeasures and suggestions.
