CAJ | 학술논문

本文以我国上市公司为研究对象，结合我国特殊的制度背景，从投资效率角度研究机构投资者对大股东控制权私利的治理效应，以及机构投资者与大股东控制在公司治理方面的交互作用。结果发现，大股东持股比例与非效率投资呈正相关，但在两类不同产权公司中存在差异；机构持股变化在两类公司中均与非效率投资呈显著负相关，但其程度在非国有公司更为显著。这一结果表明机构投资者能有效抑制大股东的非效率投资行为，但其在国有公司中的治理效应受到限制。文章的研究结论对进一步推进国有企业产权制度改革，提升企业投资效率及决策质量具有极其重要的价值，同时也为我国大力发展机构投资者的相关决策提供依据。
본문이아국상시공사위연구대상，결합아국특수적제도배경，종투자효솔각도연구궤구투자자대대고동공제권사리적치리효응，이급궤구투자자여대고동공제재공사치리방면적교호작용。결과발현，대고동지고비례여비효솔투자정정상관，단재량류불동산권공사중존재차이；궤구지고변화재량류공사중균여비효솔투자정현저부상관，단기정도재비국유공사경위현저。저일결과표명궤구투자자능유효억제대고동적비효솔투자행위，단기재국유공사중적치리효응수도한제。문장적연구결론대진일보추진국유기업산권제도개혁，제승기업투자효솔급결책질량구유겁기중요적개치，동시야위아국대력발전궤구투자자적상관결책제공의거。
Focusing on the listed companies of China, and combining with China＇s distinctive system background, this paper, on the basis of controlling the endogenous issue of institutional investors, studies the role of corporate governance of institutional investors to private benefits of control （PBC） of large shareholders from the perspective of investment efficiency, and their interactive effect. We find that holding proportions of the large shareholders are positively correlated with inefficient investment, with the difference between in state-owned companies and in non-state-owned ones. There is a significant negative correlation between shareholding fluctuation of the institutional investors and inefficient investment, which is more significant in non-state-owned finns. It shows that the institutional investors can effectively restrain inefficient investment, but state-owned controlling will restrict their governance effect. The conclusion has important implications to further advance the property fight system reform of state-owned enterprises, and to enhance investment efficiency and provides evidence for the decisions of developing institutional investors in China.