南开经济研究
南開經濟研究
남개경제연구
Nankai Economic Studies
2013年
1期
144~152
,共null页
成本不对称 卡特尔稳定性 帕廷金规则 平衡诱惑均衡
成本不對稱 卡特爾穩定性 帕廷金規則 平衡誘惑均衡
성본불대칭 잡특이은정성 파정금규칙 평형유혹균형
Cost Asymmetries; Cartel Stability; Patinkin＇s Rule; Blalanced Temptation
经济学家和政策制定者一般都认为,成本不对称使卡特尔协议变得更难维持。本文旨在分析这种传统观点对于卡特尔产量分配规则的敏感性。基于无限重复古诺双寡头博弈框架,运用Friedman的严酷触发惩罚策略以及平衡诱惑概念,本文证明,成本不对称与卡特尔稳定性的关系取决于卡特尔的产量分配规则：当帕廷金产量分配规则可行时,成本不对称使合谋协议变得更难维持的传统观点成立;但是,当帕廷金规则不可行而改用修正的帕廷金规则时,其结论与传统观点截然相反,即随着成本不对称程度的提高,卡特尔变得更加稳定。
經濟學傢和政策製定者一般都認為,成本不對稱使卡特爾協議變得更難維持。本文旨在分析這種傳統觀點對于卡特爾產量分配規則的敏感性。基于無限重複古諾雙寡頭博弈框架,運用Friedman的嚴酷觸髮懲罰策略以及平衡誘惑概唸,本文證明,成本不對稱與卡特爾穩定性的關繫取決于卡特爾的產量分配規則：噹帕廷金產量分配規則可行時,成本不對稱使閤謀協議變得更難維持的傳統觀點成立;但是,噹帕廷金規則不可行而改用脩正的帕廷金規則時,其結論與傳統觀點截然相反,即隨著成本不對稱程度的提高,卡特爾變得更加穩定。
경제학가화정책제정자일반도인위,성본불대칭사잡특이협의변득경난유지。본문지재분석저충전통관점대우잡특이산량분배규칙적민감성。기우무한중복고낙쌍과두박혁광가,운용Friedman적엄혹촉발징벌책략이급평형유혹개념,본문증명,성본불대칭여잡특이은정성적관계취결우잡특이적산량분배규칙：당파정금산량분배규칙가행시,성본불대칭사합모협의변득경난유지적전통관점성립;단시,당파정금규칙불가행이개용수정적파정금규칙시,기결론여전통관점절연상반,즉수착성본불대칭정도적제고,잡특이변득경가은정。
The purpose of this paper is to challenge the conventional wisdom that cost asymmetry decreases the stability of cartel agreement. Based on the framework of infinitely repeated duopoly game, using the concepts of grim trigger strategy and balanced temptation, this paper shows that the relationship between the cost asymmetry and the car- tel stability dependents on the output quotas rule of a cartel. When the Patinkin＇s rule is fea- sible, the conventional wisdom holds. However, when the Patinkin＇s rule is infeasible, using the improved Patinkin＇s rule, the result is in stark contrast to conventional wisdom in Industrial Organization： as the degree of cost asymmetry between firms increases, a cartel becomes more stable.
