CAJ | 학술논문

利用商业信用再分配的基本原理，从金融漏损和信贷歧视的视角系统研究了银行借款与商业信用之间的关系。研究结果显示，体制内的国有企业在正规金融市场上获得的银行贷款并未完全转化为产出，其中一部分则是以应收账款的形式发生了漏损。进一步研究发现，上述金融漏损效应在盈利能力低的国有企业表现得更明显。而正规金融市场上的信贷配给和所有制歧视迫使民营企业使用了更多的基于隐性契约关系的商业信用。
이용상업신용재분배적기본원리，종금융루손화신대기시적시각계통연구료은행차관여상업신용지간적관계。연구결과현시，체제내적국유기업재정규금융시장상획득적은행대관병미완전전화위산출，기중일부분칙시이응수장관적형식발생료루손。진일보연구발현，상술금융루손효응재영리능력저적국유기업표현득경명현。이정규금융시장상적신대배급화소유제기시박사민영기업사용료경다적기우은성계약관계적상업신용。
Based on the fundamental principle of trade credit redistribution, using observations of the Chinese listed com- panies of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in 2003 -2010, this paper empirically studies on the relationship between bank loan and trade credit from the perspective of financial leakage and bank discrimination. The results show that bank loans of state-owned controlling companies are significantly positively associated with their accounts receivable, suggesting that bank formal loans available to state-owned controlling companies are not converted into outputs completely, some of which are infor- mally transfferred to other enterprises through the channel of trade credit. What＇s more, this financial leakage effect is even more significant in less profitable state-owned controlling companies. On the contrary, bank loans of private-owned controlling companies are significantly negatively associated with their accounts payable, which means that credit discriminations in formal financial markets, as well as the failure of law protection to private property rights during the economic transition in China, force private-owned controlling companies to use more trade credits based on implicit contractual relationship in order to amel- iorate financial constraints facing in formal financial markets. Though trade credits can play an important role in promoting growth of private-owned controlling companies, an effective formal financial system is critical for a country＇s economy long-term development.