CAJ | 학술논문

近年来政府投资项目腐败合谋事件屡禁不止,为了有效抑制代建制模式下的合谋行为,本文对政府投资代建项目合谋监管威慑模型进行了研究。首先根据我国政府投资代建制的实施现状,分析代建项目的合谋机制和合谋主体的心理特征。然后结合前景理论和博弈理论,将代建制实施分为实施试点阶段和全面实施期两个阶段,分别建立合谋监管威慑模型,得到混合战略的均衡解。最后,讨论了不同模型参数下的合谋条件,识别出合谋监管的关键变量。依据模型结果给出基于前景理论的有限理性合谋监管策略,为政府完善代建制监管体系提供参考。
근년래정부투자항목부패합모사건루금불지,위료유효억제대건제모식하적합모행위,본문대정부투자대건항목합모감관위섭모형진행료연구。수선근거아국정부투자대건제적실시현상,분석대건항목적합모궤제화합모주체적심리특정。연후결합전경이론화박혁이론,장대건제실시분위실시시점계단화전면실시기량개계단,분별건립합모감관위섭모형,득도혼합전략적균형해。최후,토론료불동모형삼수하적합모조건,식별출합모감관적관건변량。의거모형결과급출기우전경이론적유한이성합모감관책략,위정부완선대건제감관체계제공삼고。
Although the related laws are strict and Chinese government has taken a variety of special measures, corruption or collusion still exists in many government investment projects. Some people who have the fluke mind choose the collusion even under the condition that penalties are much higher than benefits. This irrational behavior can＇ t be explained by the Expectancy Theory and the traditional Game Theory. The main reason is that previous researchers fail to consider the cognitive bias under uncertain risks. Therefore, this paper studies a fundamental research on psychological characteristics to better reflect the reality after considering the Game Theory assumptions. First of all, decision-making actions and psychological characteristics are identified via analyzing the implementation process of Chinese agent construction system and collusion mechanism. The psychological characteristics of collusion actors meet the Prospect Theory. The collusion deterrence model having the bounded rationality assumption is proposed based on Prospect Theory and Game Theory. The Game model＇ s assumptions are adjusted from complete rationality to bounded rationality. Moreover, the implementation process is divided into pilot and implementation stages. Different stages have different model parameters and different mixed strategy equilibriums. A reputation loss coefficient is defined to analyze the effect of reputation on decisions in the process of solving equilibrium. Finally, sensitivity analysis on the model parameters is carried out to estimate the degree of parameter sensitivity. The key variables to reducing collusion are identified. From the results of the equilibrium and sensitive analysis, some suggestions about agent construction supervision are proposed. The government should implement coordinated supervision and differentiation supervision in order to improve the supervision efficiency. Collusion benefit and collusion cost should be controlled at the same time. Combining the mainstream supervision methods with auxiliary supervision methods can improve the effectiveness of supervision deterrence. It is important to fine-tune the collusion deterrence system, as well as prevent corruption and collusion to form the credit system and encourage social supervision.