管理工程学报
管理工程學報
관리공정학보
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
2013年
2期
177~186
,共null页
满青珊 张金隆 种晓丽 杨永清
滿青珊 張金隆 種曉麗 楊永清
만청산 장금륭 충효려 양영청
博弈论 移动增值服务 双渠道 单边转移支付 纳什谈判
博弈論 移動增值服務 雙渠道 單邊轉移支付 納什談判
박혁론 이동증치복무 쌍거도 단변전이지부 납십담판
Game Theory; mobile value-added service ; dual-channel; side-payment ; Nash bargaining
移动互联网改变了移动增值服务的运营模式,产生了移动增值服务双渠道系统,对移动增值服务价值链的协调提出了更高的要求。假设需求由企业的营销努力决定、服务提供商(SP)在移动互联网服务上存在竞争,基于博弈论构建了由一个运营商(MNO)和两个SP组成的双渠道模型,设计了一个多重单边转移支付机制。研究发现:(1)上游竞争影响下,运营商在分散决策时投入的营销努力小于纵向整合时的营销努力,但SP在分散决策和纵向整合时投入的营销努力大小关系取决于竞争强度;(2)多重单边转移支付机制能够鼓励企业以全局最优的方案进行决策,并公平的分配协调后的系统盈余,从而充分协调移动增值服务双渠道系统。研究为运营商和SP提高系统和各自绩效提供了一种可行方案。
移動互聯網改變瞭移動增值服務的運營模式,產生瞭移動增值服務雙渠道繫統,對移動增值服務價值鏈的協調提齣瞭更高的要求。假設需求由企業的營銷努力決定、服務提供商(SP)在移動互聯網服務上存在競爭,基于博弈論構建瞭由一箇運營商(MNO)和兩箇SP組成的雙渠道模型,設計瞭一箇多重單邊轉移支付機製。研究髮現:(1)上遊競爭影響下,運營商在分散決策時投入的營銷努力小于縱嚮整閤時的營銷努力,但SP在分散決策和縱嚮整閤時投入的營銷努力大小關繫取決于競爭彊度;(2)多重單邊轉移支付機製能夠鼓勵企業以全跼最優的方案進行決策,併公平的分配協調後的繫統盈餘,從而充分協調移動增值服務雙渠道繫統。研究為運營商和SP提高繫統和各自績效提供瞭一種可行方案。
이동호련망개변료이동증치복무적운영모식,산생료이동증치복무쌍거도계통,대이동증치복무개치련적협조제출료경고적요구。가설수구유기업적영소노력결정、복무제공상(SP)재이동호련망복무상존재경쟁,기우박혁론구건료유일개운영상(MNO)화량개SP조성적쌍거도모형,설계료일개다중단변전이지부궤제。연구발현:(1)상유경쟁영향하,운영상재분산결책시투입적영소노력소우종향정합시적영소노력,단SP재분산결책화종향정합시투입적영소노력대소관계취결우경쟁강도;(2)다중단변전이지부궤제능구고려기업이전국최우적방안진행결책,병공평적분배협조후적계통영여,종이충분협조이동증치복무쌍거도계통。연구위운영상화SP제고계통화각자적효제공료일충가행방안。
Mobile Internet has become one of the most widely used applications since 3G was launched because it has significant influence on reconstructing a value chain. It has improved the channel power of the terminal, and lead to the inapplicability of the walled garden mode of the Mobile Network Operator (MNO) regarding to the mobile value-added service and the dual-channel phenomenon in the mobile value-added service market. The decentralized decision of companies in the value chain, dual-channel, and the competition among the Service Providers (SPs) on the mobile Internet makes the cooperation of the mobile value-added service value chain become different, and suggests higher requirements for coordination of mobile value-added service value chain. The coordination of the dual-channel system has not received enough attention in the existing researches. First, the existing coordinating mechanisms improve the system performance, but they do not achieve the overall optimum, and reasonably distribute the system' s profit. The coordinating mechanism of the mobile value-added service value chain in the competition environment needs to be researched. Based on thepractice of Chinese mobile telecommunication industry and by extending the Tsay & Agrawal' s study, a game theoretical mobile value-added service chain model is constructed. This model is composed of a MNO andtwo competitive SPs. A muhi- side-payments mechanism is proposed to fully coordinate the dual-channel system of mobile value-added service. The mobilevalue-added services are classified into cooperative mobile service and mobile Internet service in this article, and the assumptions are as follows: ( 1 ) the mobile Internet service generates revenues for the SPs, (2) The demand volumes of services are assumed to depend on the marketing efforts of companies, (3) With each cooperation, the marketing effort for either the MNO or the SP exhibits a positive externality for the other, (4) The two SPs compete in mobile Interne services, and (5) It is a non-cooperative Staekelberg game between the three companies, as well as the SPS acts as a leader, and the MNO acts as a follower. The research firstly analyzes the equilibrium of the model, and finds that with the influence of upstream competition the marketing effort of MNO is lower when it is decentralized than when it is vertically integrated. However, whether the marketing effort of SPs is lower in decentralization depends on competition intensity. Second, the research solves the Pareto efficiency set of the mobile value-added service' s dual-channel system, and designs three transfer functions and three constant side payments on the multi-side-payment mechanism. The transfer functions encourage companies to make decisions at global optimization level and divides system-wide surplus fairly. These functions also coordinate the cooperation between MNO and SPs, and the competition between SPs. The constant side payments equally allocate the system-wide surplus after coordination. Finally, the research validates the multi-side-payments mechanism with number simulation. With such coordination, the total channel profit in the decentralized decision situation equals to the vertically integrated situation. Each company receives more profit in this condition than in the pre-coordinating decentralized decision situation. The multi-side-payments satisfies the two criteria of properly developed coordination mechanism. Although there is competition between SPs and MNO, SPs can design multi-side-payments with certain revenue sharing ratio, negotiate their marketing efforts, and contract their transferring or transferred side payment in order to ensure better performance of each company. In summary, multi-side-payment mechanism is a significant reference for the coordination of mobile value-added service value chain in the mobile Internet environment.