贵州财经大学学报
貴州財經大學學報
귀주재경대학학보
Journal of Guizhou College of Finance and Economics
2013年
3期
29~36
,共null页
股权激励 过度投资 投资不足 匹配方法
股權激勵 過度投資 投資不足 匹配方法
고권격려 과도투자 투자불족 필배방법
Equity incentive, Overinvestment, Underinvestment, Matching method
应用Rosenbaum and Rubin(1983)的匹配方法分析股权激励对投资非效率的影响,以除股权激励因素以外的公司其他特征变量相近为依据进行样本配对,分析股权激励的激励效应,减少了样本选择偏差。结果表明:(1)股权激励对投资非效率、过度投资的影响不显著,对投资不足有显著的抑制作用i(2)在国有属性的调节作用下,股权激励计划对非国有企业投资不足的抑制作用强于国有企业;(3)国有企业的“期权激励”与“股票激励”方式对投资不足的抑制作用没有显著差别,非国有企业的“期权激励”方式抑制作用强于“股票激励”方式:(4)在股权分散的条件,实施股权激励计划对投资不足有显著抑制作用;在股权集中的条件下,实施股权激励计划对投资不足的影响不显著。
應用Rosenbaum and Rubin(1983)的匹配方法分析股權激勵對投資非效率的影響,以除股權激勵因素以外的公司其他特徵變量相近為依據進行樣本配對,分析股權激勵的激勵效應,減少瞭樣本選擇偏差。結果錶明:(1)股權激勵對投資非效率、過度投資的影響不顯著,對投資不足有顯著的抑製作用i(2)在國有屬性的調節作用下,股權激勵計劃對非國有企業投資不足的抑製作用彊于國有企業;(3)國有企業的“期權激勵”與“股票激勵”方式對投資不足的抑製作用沒有顯著差彆,非國有企業的“期權激勵”方式抑製作用彊于“股票激勵”方式:(4)在股權分散的條件,實施股權激勵計劃對投資不足有顯著抑製作用;在股權集中的條件下,實施股權激勵計劃對投資不足的影響不顯著。
응용Rosenbaum and Rubin(1983)적필배방법분석고권격려대투자비효솔적영향,이제고권격려인소이외적공사기타특정변량상근위의거진행양본배대,분석고권격려적격려효응,감소료양본선택편차。결과표명:(1)고권격려대투자비효솔、과도투자적영향불현저,대투자불족유현저적억제작용i(2)재국유속성적조절작용하,고권격려계화대비국유기업투자불족적억제작용강우국유기업;(3)국유기업적“기권격려”여“고표격려”방식대투자불족적억제작용몰유현저차별,비국유기업적“기권격려”방식억제작용강우“고표격려”방식:(4)재고권분산적조건,실시고권격려계화대투자불족유현저억제작용;재고권집중적조건하,실시고권격려계화대투자불족적영향불현저。
In the paper, we study the relationship between equity incentive and non - efficiency of the investment using matching method developed by Rubin (1973) , Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), According to matching theory, first, we matching sample based on firm close characteristic variables , In addition to equity incentive factors, then analysis the incentive effects of equity incentives, Reducing the sample selection bias, the results show that : ( 1 ) Equity incentive had no significant effect on investment inefficiency and overinvestment, can significantly inhibit underinvestment; (2) the equity incentive for non - state - owned enterprises had stronger inhibitory effect on underinvestment than that of the state - owned enterprises ; ( 3 ) For state - owned enterprises, there is no significant difference of the inhibition on underinvestment between "equity incentive" and "stock incentive", For non -state -owned enterprises, the " equity incentive" approach had stronger inhibitory effect than that of "stock incentive", (4) equity incentive can significantly inhibit underinvestment under the condition of dispersed ownership, but, equity incentive cannot significantly inhibit underinvestment under the condition of concentrated ownership.