CAJ | 학술논문

在纳税人存在多种应纳税所得时，将企业治理结构中的委托-代理关系作为核心要素，在集中考虑税收逃避与税务筹划双重行为的基础上，通过对“税收征管机关-纳税人”之间的征纳行为进行刻画，构建了不完全信息多阶段博弈模型。在无委托-代理与委托-代理两种状态下，得出了博弈均衡解并分别进行了分析；进一步地，通过无委托-代理与委托-代理两种状态的比较，指出了委托-代理会带来效率损失问题。分析了一系列税收征管变量的经济效应，指出税率、逃税惩罚率、审计率等的提升会显著地降低企业主与管理人员的期望收益，但会促使企业为减少税负而进行税收逃避，加大了其收益的波动风险。同时指出了所得税逃避并不适合日益强化的税收征管环境。为此，在委托-代理环境下，企业主通过设计相关契约及加强监督等措施，一方面，可以有效规避管理人员的税收逃避行为，鼓励其税务筹划行为；另一方面，可以提升企业主与管理人员的期望收益。
재납세인존재다충응납세소득시，장기업치리결구중적위탁-대리관계작위핵심요소，재집중고필세수도피여세무주화쌍중행위적기출상，통과대“세수정관궤관-납세인”지간적정납행위진행각화，구건료불완전신식다계단박혁모형。재무위탁-대리여위탁-대리량충상태하，득출료박혁균형해병분별진행료분석；진일보지，통과무위탁-대리여위탁-대리량충상태적비교，지출료위탁-대리회대래효솔손실문제。분석료일계렬세수정관변량적경제효응，지출세솔、도세징벌솔、심계솔등적제승회현저지강저기업주여관리인원적기망수익，단회촉사기업위감소세부이진행세수도피，가대료기수익적파동풍험。동시지출료소득세도피병불괄합일익강화적세수정관배경。위차，재위탁-대리배경하，기업주통과설계상관계약급가강감독등조시，일방면，가이유효규피관리인원적세수도피행위，고려기세무주화행위；령일방면，가이제승기업주여관리인원적기망수익。
when multiply taxable income for taxpayer existed, the principal-agent relationship at the corporate governance structure as a core element,the dual - action of tax evasion and tax planning being considered centralized, through the lev-ying - paying action description betweenthe tax collection authority and the taxpayer, one multi - stage game model under in-complete information environment is established. The equilibrium game solutions are obtained, analyzed by followed under the principal - agent state and without principal - agent state. Further,by using two state comparisons between principal - agent state and without principal - agent state, the loss of efficiency caused by principal - agent is pointed out. The economic effects with series of variables concerning tax - collecting isanalyzed. Although the expected return for the business owners and managers will be reduced significantly by the improvement of tax rate, tax evasion penalty rates, audit rates, the fluctua-tion risk will be enlarged because the enterprise want to reduce its tax burden by using the way of tax evasion. And the in-come tax evasion ,which isn＇t suitable for increasingly sophisticated tax- collecting environment, is pointed out. Under the principal - agent environment,by designing related contract and taking more supervisory measures with business owners, as a result, on the one hand, managers will be encouraged to avoid tax evasion behavior and to encourage tax planning behavior instead; on the other hand,the expectations of earnings can enhanced for the business owners and management.