CAJ | 학술논문

文章基于微分博弈原理，构建了全球福利最大化下的两国微分博弈模型．分析了碳税、碳关税、碳减排合作三种气候政策对全球福利和全球碳排放的影响。运用Hamilton—Jacobi—Bellman方程分别求得了静态线性Markov完美纳什均衡的最优碳税和碳关税水平。研究发现．在给定的碳排放水平下，全球福利在单边碳税政策下最小，碳关税次之，碳减排合作政策下最大；但碳排放存量则以单边碳税政策的最大，碳关税政策的次之，碳减排合作政策的最小；就全球碳减排效应而言，碳减排合作政策是最优的，碳关税政策次之，单边碳税政策最差。这主要是由于单边碳税存在“碳泄漏”现象和“免费搭车效应”，使执行相对宽松环境标准的国家从中受益．同时严格的气候政策将有利于气候宽松政策国家的企业国际竞争力的提高，即存在“租金转移效应”。碳关税和碳减排合作政策则可以部分或完全消除这些效应的影响。
문장기우미분박혁원리，구건료전구복리최대화하적량국미분박혁모형．분석료탄세、탄관세、탄감배합작삼충기후정책대전구복리화전구탄배방적영향。운용Hamilton—Jacobi—Bellman방정분별구득료정태선성Markov완미납십균형적최우탄세화탄관세수평。연구발현．재급정적탄배방수평하，전구복리재단변탄세정책하최소，탄관세차지，탄감배합작정책하최대；단탄배방존량칙이단변탄세정책적최대，탄관세정책적차지，탄감배합작정책적최소；취전구탄감배효응이언，탄감배합작정책시최우적，탄관세정책차지，단변탄세정책최차。저주요시유우단변탄세존재“탄설루”현상화“면비탑차효응”，사집행상대관송배경표준적국가종중수익．동시엄격적기후정책장유리우기후관송정책국가적기업국제경쟁력적제고，즉존재“조금전이효응”。탄관세화탄감배합작정책칙가이부분혹완전소제저사효응적영향。
Based on the theory of differential game, the paper constructs the differential game model of two countries in the condition of global warfare maximization, analyzes the effect of carbon tax, carbon tariff and carbon emission cooperation policy on global warfare, and gets the optimal carbon tax rate and carbon tariff rate in a stationary Markov perfect Nash equilibrium by using Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. The results show that given the same level of carbon emissions, global welfare is the least with the one-side policy of carbon tax, more with the policy of carbon tariff and the most with the policy of carbon emission cooperation. But when it comes to the stock of carbon emissions, the largest amount lies with the one-side policy of carbon tax, the next largest with the policy of carbon tariff and the least with the policy of carbon emission cooperation. Besides, in terms of effects of global carbon emissions, the biggest one is the policy of carbon emission cooperation, the second biggest one is the policy of carbon tariff and the least one is the one-side policy of carbon tax. This is because in the presence of carbon tax, there exist ＂carbon leakage＂ and ＂free-riding effect＂, which benefits the foreign country with a looser environmental policy, and at the same time, a tougher climate policy in the home country enhances the competitiveness of the foreign firm as a result of an increase in the home firm＇s pollution abatement costs, which is called ＂rent-shifting effect＂. In addition, carbon tariff policy and carbon emission corporation policy can partially or completely eliminate these effects.