CAJ | 학술논문

本文以2004—2009年间中国民营上市公司为研究样本，考察了地区投资者保护与政治联系对企业资本配置效率的影响。研究发现：（1）良好的地区投资者保护会提高公司投资效率，降低融资约束，而政治联系对投资效率的影响不显著；（2）相比没有政治联系的上市公司，投资者保护机制对具有政治联系公司的资本配置效率的影响更加明显；（3）在投资者保护水平越高的地区，企业投资支出能带来越高的业绩增长，而政治联系未对业绩增长与投资支出之间的敏感性产生影响。本文将投资者保护制度与政治联系同时纳入研究框架，为我们比较转型经济中正式制度环境与非正式替代性机制的作用提供了有益视角。
본문이2004—2009년간중국민영상시공사위연구양본，고찰료지구투자자보호여정치련계대기업자본배치효솔적영향。연구발현：（1）량호적지구투자자보호회제고공사투자효솔，강저융자약속，이정치련계대투자효솔적영향불현저；（2）상비몰유정치련계적상시공사，투자자보호궤제대구유정치련계공사적자본배치효솔적영향경가명현；（3）재투자자보호수평월고적지구，기업투자지출능대래월고적업적증장，이정치련계미대업적증장여투자지출지간적민감성산생영향。본문장투자자보호제도여정치련계동시납입연구광가，위아문비교전형경제중정식제도배경여비정식체대성궤제적작용제공료유익시각。
Using the sample of the Chinese private listed firms from 2004 to 2009, this paper tests the impact of local investor protection and political connections on the firm＇s capital allocation efficiency. The results suggest that firstly, better investor protection can improve investment efficiency and reduce financing constrain, while political connections have no effect on investment efficiency. Secondly, comparing with the firms with no politi cal connections, investor protection has more significant effect on the capital allocation of the finns with political connections. Thirdly, firm level investment predicts growth more strongly in the regions with better investor protection, while political connections have no significant effect on the firm＇s growth sensitivity to investment. This paper combines investor protection system and political connections into the research framework, and pro vides us with a meaningful perspective to compare formal institutional environment with informal substitute insti tution in the transitional economy.