CAJ | 학술논문

目前监事和独立董事被排除在上市公司股权激励对象之外,但仍有学者认为对监事和独立董事实施股权激励能有效降低代理成本。基于此,作者获取2009～2011年479家上市公司的1437个平衡面板数据,建立多元回归模型,分析了在公司治理因素交互作用下监事激励和独立董事激励对两类代理成本的影响。研究发现,在考虑公司治理因素的交互作用时,监事和独立董事激励在两类代理问题中均未能发挥治理作用。最后在肯定激励必要性的前提下,从薪酬制定和声誉方面提出提高激励效果的建议。
목전감사화독립동사피배제재상시공사고권격려대상지외,단잉유학자인위대감사화독립동사실시고권격려능유효강저대리성본。기우차,작자획취2009～2011년479가상시공사적1437개평형면판수거,건립다원회귀모형,분석료재공사치리인소교호작용하감사격려화독립동사격려대량류대리성본적영향。연구발현,재고필공사치리인소적교호작용시,감사화독립동사격려재량류대리문제중균미능발휘치리작용。최후재긍정격려필요성적전제하,종신수제정화성예방면제출제고격려효과적건의。
Supervisors and independent directors are outside of the listed company equity incentive object,but there are still scholars believe that the implementation of equity incentive for supervisors and independent directors can effectively reduce agency costs.Based on this,the authors obtain 1437 balanced panel data of 479 listed companies from 2009 to 2011,building a multiple regression model,analyzing the effects on incentive of supervisors and independent directors to the two types of agency costs under the interaction of the corporate governance factors.The study found that the incentives of supervisors and independent directors failed to play a role of governance in the two types of agency problem considering the interaction of the corporate governance factors.Finally,under the premise of the necessity for motivate,we put forward some suggestion to improve the incentive effect from the remuneration and reputation.