CAJ | 학술논문

在公平竞争机制缺失的转型经济中，腐败行为发挥着特殊的资源配置功能，能够给企业带来利益。本文使用世界银行中国企业问卷调查数据考察了腐败对企业产品销售行为的影响，其中腐败活动用招待费支出近似刻画。研究证实，招待费的确被企业用作不正当竞争的手段：招待费支出越多，企业获得的政府订单和国有企业订单也越多。文章排除了来自正常关系资本投资假说的替代性解释，并进一步控制了内生性问题。
재공평경쟁궤제결실적전형경제중，부패행위발휘착특수적자원배치공능，능구급기업대래이익。본문사용세계은행중국기업문권조사수거고찰료부패대기업산품소수행위적영향，기중부패활동용초대비지출근사각화。연구증실，초대비적학피기업용작불정당경쟁적수단：초대비지출월다，기업획득적정부정단화국유기업정단야월다。문장배제료래자정상관계자본투자가설적체대성해석，병진일보공제료내생성문제。
In transitional economy where fair competition lacks, corruption behaviors may help resource allocation which does benefit to firms. With the survey data of World Bank with regard to Chinese firms, we investigate the relationship between firm＇s corruption and its sales behavior, in which corruption is represented approximately by entertaining expenditure. We confirm that entertaining expenditure is surely used by firm as means of malfeasant competition because of the fact that the more entertaining expenditure, the more purchase orders it earns from government and state-owned enterprises. We rule out the alternative explanation derived from the hypothesis of normal relationship-capital investment, and control for the problem of endogeneity.