CAJ | 학술논문

秦汉以降,中国古代各朝都以强化专职监察权作为防治腐败的重要措施,这种措施虽然对于澄清吏治起到了一定的作用,但也产生了一系列弊害和恶果,其主要表现是：以监察职能混淆行政职能和审判职能,扰乱正常的行政秩序和司法秩序;监察机关和监察官员因拥权过重且缺乏监督而自身严重腐败;监察机关因其工具性本质而使其职能发生严重异化。就总体的实施效果而言,中国古代强化监察权并没有成为防治腐败的良策,相反在很大程度上加剧了贪腐之风和强化了腐败产生机制。中国古代强化监察权之所以没有成功,其根源是权力一体化的政治制度。
진한이강,중국고대각조도이강화전직감찰권작위방치부패적중요조시,저충조시수연대우징청리치기도료일정적작용,단야산생료일계렬폐해화악과,기주요표현시：이감찰직능혼효행정직능화심판직능,우란정상적행정질서화사법질서;감찰궤관화감찰관원인옹권과중차결핍감독이자신엄중부패;감찰궤관인기공구성본질이사기직능발생엄중이화。취총체적실시효과이언,중국고대강화감찰권병몰유성위방치부패적량책,상반재흔대정도상가극료탐부지풍화강화료부패산생궤제。중국고대강화감찰권지소이몰유성공,기근원시권력일체화적정치제도。
From the Qin and Han dynasties on, every dynasty in China strengthened the professional su-pervision to prevent corruption, but it still brought about evil consequences. Supervision function dis-turbed the usual administration and legal system and abused the power, which led to more serious corrup-tion. In general, the supervision system in ancient China could not prevent corruption, and further led to more corruption. The root for this is the political system of power centralization.