南开管理评论
南開管理評論
남개관리평론
Nankai Business Review
2013年
3期
57~68
,共null页
家族企业 资源约束 外部投资者 合同剩余 治理效率
傢族企業 資源約束 外部投資者 閤同剩餘 治理效率
가족기업 자원약속 외부투자자 합동잉여 치리효솔
Family Business; Resources Restriction; Outside Investor; Contract Surplus; Governance Efficiency
本文以2004—2008年我国A股家族上市公司为研究样本,采用非平衡面板数据,研究了家族企业引进外部投资者的动因,并分析了外部投资者的进入对家族企业治理效率的影响。研究表明,国内家族企业由于资源约束而引进外部投资者,但是在引进的时候会根据家族自身偏好对不同投资者而有所选择。进一步研究发现,战略投资者的引进能够长期有效地提升家族企业的治理效率,而财务投资者的引进对家族企业治理效率的影响并不显著。
本文以2004—2008年我國A股傢族上市公司為研究樣本,採用非平衡麵闆數據,研究瞭傢族企業引進外部投資者的動因,併分析瞭外部投資者的進入對傢族企業治理效率的影響。研究錶明,國內傢族企業由于資源約束而引進外部投資者,但是在引進的時候會根據傢族自身偏好對不同投資者而有所選擇。進一步研究髮現,戰略投資者的引進能夠長期有效地提升傢族企業的治理效率,而財務投資者的引進對傢族企業治理效率的影響併不顯著。
본문이2004—2008년아국A고가족상시공사위연구양본,채용비평형면판수거,연구료가족기업인진외부투자자적동인,병분석료외부투자자적진입대가족기업치리효솔적영향。연구표명,국내가족기업유우자원약속이인진외부투자자,단시재인진적시후회근거가족자신편호대불동투자자이유소선택。진일보연구발현,전략투자자적인진능구장기유효지제승가족기업적치리효솔,이재무투자자적인진대가족기업치리효솔적영향병불현저。
Taking A-share listed family companies in China from 2004 to 2008 as a sample, the article draws on unbalanced panel data to explore the motivation and cause of family business introducing outside investors. Meanwhile, the article analyzes how the entry of outside investors influences the governance efficiency of family business. The research findings show that Chinese family businesses introduce outside investors due to the resources restriction and that their selections of outside investors are in accordance with family self-preferences. For instance, the family businesses with high extent of specialization tend to usher in strategic investors, because those family businesses are insufficient of experience in other new fields and of funds transfers of internal capital markets under the diversification. Therefore, these family businesses not only demand outside capitals but are in need of successful businesses' management experience and technical support in other fields. In comparison with financial investors pursuing profits, strategic investors are more instrumental in the development of family businesses with high specialization. However, our findings also demonstrate that the larger-scale family businesses tend to usher in financial investors, because these family businesses of large asset sizes possess high reputation, which can help gain high credit lines and which may be faced with more investment opportunities. Therefore, the controlling shareholders of large-scale family businesses expect to gain more capitals by means of introducing financial investors in order to satisfy their needs of investment expenditure. These family businesses are reluctant to introduce strategic investors through equity transfers, which may result in the dilution of residual right of control. The study further indicates that the introduction of strategic investors can promote the governance efficiency of family business effectively in the long run and that by contrast the introduction of financial investors exerts an unremarkable impact on the governance efficiency of family business. This regression result was verified when the problem of variable endogeneity had been solved with many diverse methods and the result underwent a relatively high robustness examination.