CAJ | 학술논문

上市公司定向增发是其重要的财务决策，往往涉及公司治理的好坏。历来受到网络舆论的关注。本文利用股吧中针对上市公司定向增发的评论这一个特定数据作为网络舆论的替代变量，研究在网络时代网络舆论对于公司内部以及外部的治理机制的影响，特别是在我国法律保护不健全的现实环境下，网络舆论在保护中小投资者权益方面所发挥的作用。实证结果表明，遭到网络舆论反对的增发公司，其定向增发公告后的股票超额收益率显著为负，其后该定向增发预案通过相关部门审核的概率也显著下降。换句话说，网络舆论会先后触发两层外部治理机制——资本市场的惩戒和监管部门的严格审查。与之形成对比的是，没有证据表明网络负面舆论会触发内部治理机制——网络负面舆论对于定向增发预案通过股东大会的概率不产生显著影响。本文进一步发现，网络负面舆论越高的公司，增发实施之后，公司业绩下降的概率也越大，这表明网络舆论并非是空穴来风或是毫无根据，而是能够在事前发掘出定向增发中可能存在的问题。
상시공사정향증발시기중요적재무결책，왕왕섭급공사치리적호배。력래수도망락여론적관주。본문이용고파중침대상시공사정향증발적평론저일개특정수거작위망락여론적체대변량，연구재망락시대망락여론대우공사내부이급외부적치리궤제적영향，특별시재아국법률보호불건전적현실배경하，망락여론재보호중소투자자권익방면소발휘적작용。실증결과표명，조도망락여론반대적증발공사，기정향증발공고후적고표초액수익솔현저위부，기후해정향증발예안통과상관부문심핵적개솔야현저하강。환구화설，망락여론회선후촉발량층외부치리궤제——자본시장적징계화감관부문적엄격심사。여지형성대비적시，몰유증거표명망락부면여론회촉발내부치리궤제——망락부면여론대우정향증발예안통과고동대회적개솔불산생현저영향。본문진일보발현，망락부면여론월고적공사，증발실시지후，공사업적하강적개솔야월대，저표명망락여론병비시공혈래풍혹시호무근거，이시능구재사전발굴출정향증발중가능존재적문제。
Private placement is one of the most important financial decisions made by the public companies. The decision is fairly related to the corporate governance inside and outside the companies. The proposal of the private placement is always catching a lot of attention in the internet public opinion. We use the rate of negative critical about the private placement from the internet message board as the proxy of the internet negative public opinion to analyze the influence of the internet public opinion on the inside and outside corporate governance mechanism during the private placement process in the modern internet times. Our paper focuses on the power of the internet public opinion in protecting the small investors under the circumstances that China has a relatively poor legal system for small investor protection. The empirical results show that the more negative of the internet public opinion on the private placement proposal, the lower the abnormal return after the announcement of private placement proposal. Furthermore the more negative of the internet public opinion on the private placement proposal, the lower the probability of the proposal passing through the censor of the government regulator. These results indicate that the internet public opinion triggers two kinds of outside corporate governance mechanisms successively： one is the negative reaction in the capital market and the other is the more strictly censor of the government regulator. However, the inside corporate governance mechanism seems be uninfluenced by the internet public opinion, as we find that the negative internet public opinion does not have significant effect on the probability of the pass of the private placement on the shareholders＇ meeting. We also find that the more negative internet public opinion on the private placement proposal, the higher probability of the decreasing of post-offering performance which means that the internet public opinion is not purely the noise or rumor or the manipulation of the market, but it reflects problems in the private placement ex-ante conditions.