南开管理评论
南開管理評論
남개관리평론
Nankai Business Review
2013年
3期
89~100
,共null页
稳健性 会计信息透明度 资产减值准备 信息不对称 盈余管理
穩健性 會計信息透明度 資產減值準備 信息不對稱 盈餘管理
은건성 회계신식투명도 자산감치준비 신식불대칭 영여관리
Conservatism; Transparency of Accounting Information; The Allowance for Asset Impairment; Information Asymmetry; Earning Management
本文以我国上市公司会计信息透明度为切入点，探讨稳健性对公司信息披露行为的影响。初步检验表明，稳健性和会计信息透明度之间呈倒u型关系，即在适度范围内，稳健性的增强有助于提升会计信息透明度，而由极端向下盈余管理引起的“过度稳健”则导致会计信息透明度下降。进一步检验发现，在剔除了盈余管理的影响后，稳健性的增强有助于提高会计信息透明度。这些结果表明，在不受盈余管理动机干扰情况下，稳健性的增强有助于缓解信息不对称水平。但是，如果企业假借稳健之名而实施极端向下的盈余管理反而会加重信息不对称程度。因此，应在大力倡导公司实施适度稳健会计的同时，需谨防公司假借稳健会计之名实行极端向下的盈余管理，会计稳健性的运用应保持一个合理的度。
本文以我國上市公司會計信息透明度為切入點，探討穩健性對公司信息披露行為的影響。初步檢驗錶明，穩健性和會計信息透明度之間呈倒u型關繫，即在適度範圍內，穩健性的增彊有助于提升會計信息透明度，而由極耑嚮下盈餘管理引起的“過度穩健”則導緻會計信息透明度下降。進一步檢驗髮現，在剔除瞭盈餘管理的影響後，穩健性的增彊有助于提高會計信息透明度。這些結果錶明，在不受盈餘管理動機榦擾情況下，穩健性的增彊有助于緩解信息不對稱水平。但是，如果企業假藉穩健之名而實施極耑嚮下的盈餘管理反而會加重信息不對稱程度。因此，應在大力倡導公司實施適度穩健會計的同時，需謹防公司假藉穩健會計之名實行極耑嚮下的盈餘管理，會計穩健性的運用應保持一箇閤理的度。
본문이아국상시공사회계신식투명도위절입점，탐토은건성대공사신식피로행위적영향。초보검험표명，은건성화회계신식투명도지간정도u형관계，즉재괄도범위내，은건성적증강유조우제승회계신식투명도，이유겁단향하영여관리인기적“과도은건”칙도치회계신식투명도하강。진일보검험발현，재척제료영여관리적영향후，은건성적증강유조우제고회계신식투명도。저사결과표명，재불수영여관리동궤간우정황하，은건성적증강유조우완해신식불대칭수평。단시，여과기업가차은건지명이실시겁단향하적영여관리반이회가중신식불대칭정도。인차，응재대력창도공사실시괄도은건회계적동시，수근방공사가차은건회계지명실행겁단향하적영여관리，회계은건성적운용응보지일개합리적도。
Information asymmetry （IA） has always been one of the problems of modern capital markets. Information disclosure is an important way for listed companies to reduce IA, and it could help to enhance the effectiveness of resource distribution in capital market. For this reason, the quality of information disclosure is directly related to the effectiveness of securities market and the investor protection issues. Therefore, the quality of information disclosure, especially the transparency of accounting information is always a hot topic. In addition, whether accounting conservatism will mitigate or aggravate the degree of IA is still disputed. Some scholars, like LaFond and Watts, argue that conservatism can reduces the manager＇s incentives and ability to manipulate accounting numbers and so reduces information asymmetry and deadweight losses that information asymmetry generates. In contrast, FASB and IASB argue that there is a conflict between conservative accounting and neutral accounting, and that the application of conservatism will distort the accounting information. Thus, the conservatism will induce the distortion of accounting information and then lead to IA. This paper investigates the impact of conservatism on disclosure from the perspective of transparency of accounting information. The preliminary test shows that there is an inverted-＇U＇ relationship between conservatism and transparency, that is, the enhancement of conservatism helps improve transparency within a moderate range of conservatism while ＂excessive conservatism＂ deriving from extreme downward earning management leads to decline in transparency. Further test shows that the enhancement of conservatism helps improve transparency after eliminating the impact of earning management on conservatism. Therefore it is shown that the enhancement of conservatism without interference of earning management motivation can help mitigate the level of information asymmetry, and that if a company carries out extremely downward earning management under the guise of conservatism, the degree of information asymmetry will be aggravated. For this reason, although it is strongly advocated that companies should implement true conservatism, we should also beware that they are engaged in extremely downward earning management under the guise of conservatism. Thus, the application of accounting conservatism should maintain a reasonable degree.
