CAJ | 학술논문

地方政府竞争的根本动力来自于地区经济增长、权力中心认可和官员自身利益（政治晋升机会）强化，而西部地区微观主体“经济增长需求偏好”的助推则加剧了承接产业转移中西部地方政府间的竞争。博彝模型分析表明地方官员的政治晋升激励制度使得承接产业转移中的地方政府竞争过度，不仅降低了产业转移的经济增长绩效，而且导致了区域间经济差异的持续扩大。基于西部承接地面临的困境，提出通过制度框架规范政府竞争行为，构建西部承接地政府行为模式的导向认知系统，建立政府间合作机制，实现西部区域舍作治理、协调发展。
지방정부경쟁적근본동력래자우지구경제증장、권력중심인가화관원자신이익（정치진승궤회）강화，이서부지구미관주체“경제증장수구편호”적조추칙가극료승접산업전이중서부지방정부간적경쟁。박이모형분석표명지방관원적정치진승격려제도사득승접산업전이중적지방정부경쟁과도，불부강저료산업전이적경제증장적효，이차도치료구역간경제차이적지속확대。기우서부승접지면림적곤경，제출통과제도광가규범정부경쟁행위，구건서부승접지정부행위모식적도향인지계통，건립정부간합작궤제，실현서부구역사작치리、협조발전。
The fundamental impetus of the competition among local governments lies in economic growth in the region, the rec- ognition of the power center and their own interests （opportunity for political promotion）. At the same time, micro- cosmic subjects in the west area who have the demand preference of economic growth aggravate the competition among local governments in the western undertaking areas. The game mode shows that the political promotion incentive sys- tem for local officials leads to excessive local government competition in undertaking industrial transfer, which not on- ly reduces the economic growth performance of industrial transfer, but also makes regional economic differences ex- pand. In order to realize the collaborative governance among local governments and a harmonious development in western areas, the paper provides some strategies for standardizing the competitive behaviors, constructing a leading cognitive system of behavior pattern and establishing a cooperative system among local governments.