CAJ | 학술논문

政策性农业保险是政府支持农业生产、稳定农户收入、促进农村可持续发展的农业支持保护体系的重要组成部分,近几年逐渐在全国各省市进行试点实施。农业保险市场上的信息不对称易引起逆向选择和道德风险问题,严重影响政策性农业保险市场的健康发展,制约农业保险作用的发挥。因此,有必要对政策性农业保险中投保农户的道德风险问题进行分析,以降低道德风险的发生,促进政策性农业保险的发展。
정책성농업보험시정부지지농업생산、은정농호수입、촉진농촌가지속발전적농업지지보호체계적중요조성부분,근궤년축점재전국각성시진행시점실시。농업보험시장상적신식불대칭역인기역향선택화도덕풍험문제,엄중영향정책성농업보험시장적건강발전,제약농업보험작용적발휘。인차,유필요대정책성농업보험중투보농호적도덕풍험문제진행분석,이강저도덕풍험적발생,촉진정책성농업보험적발전。
Under conditions of asymmetric information, the presence of the insured farmers~ moral hazard seri- ously affects the healthy operation of the policy-oriented agricultural insurance. Insured farmers moral hazard con- sists of ex ante moral hazard and ex post moral hazard, the prior existence of moral hazard leads to that the risks of agricultural production can not be completely dispersed, insurance companies bear only part of the risks of agricul- tural production, farmers must be self bear the other part of the loss;ex post moral hazard makes it possible that the insured farmers who suffered low loss claims high compensation, but there is no optimal lying probability, while the insurance company only audit those farmers reporting high loss on a certain probability; by constructing mathemati- cal models, the optimal premiums and compensation levels in insurance contract are solved and designed. On this ba- sis, the recommendations are proposed.