CAJ | 학술논문

针对反盗版政策研究中被忽略的盗版和政府监管对厂商产品质量选择的影响问题，以正版厂商、盗版厂商、政府和消费者四方博弈的信息产品市场为背景，建立了两阶段博弈模型，构建了受产品质量影响的消费者效用函数，分析了政府的反盗版监管政策对正版厂商质量选择的影响，并通过数据算例的方法分析了政府在社会福利最大化目标下的最优监管策略与厂商的质量决策．研究表明：政府的监管政策越严厉，正版厂商提供的产品质量越高．在一定的条件下，盗版厂商的仿冒水平是政府选择监管政策的关键．当仿冒水平较低时，市场机制自身的作用可以有效保护正版厂商，无需政府力量的介入，政府可以采取无保护政策．当仿冒水平较高时，市场机制的调节不足以保护正版厂商，此时，需要发挥政府监管的作用，政府应施以适度保护．
침대반도판정책연구중피홀략적도판화정부감관대엄상산품질량선택적영향문제，이정판엄상、도판엄상、정부화소비자사방박혁적신식산품시장위배경，건립료량계단박혁모형，구건료수산품질량영향적소비자효용함수，분석료정부적반도판감관정책대정판엄상질량선택적영향，병통과수거산례적방법분석료정부재사회복리최대화목표하적최우감관책략여엄상적질량결책．연구표명：정부적감관정책월엄려，정판엄상제공적산품질량월고．재일정적조건하，도판엄상적방모수평시정부선택감관정책적관건．당방모수평교저시，시장궤제자신적작용가이유효보호정판엄상，무수정부역량적개입，정부가이채취무보호정책．당방모수평교고시，시장궤제적조절불족이보호정판엄상，차시，수요발휘정부감관적작용，정부응시이괄도보호．
It has been ignored the question on the impact of the pirated products and government regula- tion on genuine manufacturers＇ quality selection. This paper analyzes the impact of government＇ supervision power and regulatory policy on manufacturers＇ quality selection through the establishment of a two-stage game model, and also analyzes the regulatory strategy and manufacturer＇s quality decision under the ob- jective of maximizing social welfare the optimal by taking data simulation methods. The results show that： The more stringent the government＇s anti-piracy regulatory policies are, the higher the product quality provided by the genuine manufacturer is. Under certain conditions, pirated manufacturers＇ the level of counterfeit is a key factors which the government choose regulatory policy. When the counterfeit level is low, the role of market mechanisms can effectively protect the genuine companies without the involvement of government forces, and the government can take no protection policies. When the counterfeit level is high, the regulation of the market mechanism can not effectively protect the genuine manufacturers, and then, need to play the role of government regulation, the government should take moderate protection.