CAJ | 학술논문

基于清洁发展机制,探讨国有大型制造型企业在面临政府的碳排放规制时如何与供应链中上、下游企业进行生产和减排决策,运用新古典经济学和博弈论的方法分析上、下游企业在3种不同合作情况下的减排效果和利润,对企业在减排过程中的相互作用、碳交易价格对减排效果的影响以及社会福利的比较等问题进行深入讨论。研究结果表明,在减排和定价均合作时各主体的利润和减排效果均最优,制造型企业在低碳化的进程中应首先瞄准碳排放量大的企业,并从其所处供应链的上游企业着手;碳交易价格随企业边际减排成本的高低而对其产生不同的影响,企业在追求利润最大化的同时会产生更多的碳排放,若要减少排放总量,必须减少一定的产量。上述结论为制造型企业做出合理的减排决策提供一定的智力支持。
기우청길발전궤제,탐토국유대형제조형기업재면림정부적탄배방규제시여하여공응련중상、하유기업진행생산화감배결책,운용신고전경제학화박혁론적방법분석상、하유기업재3충불동합작정황하적감배효과화리윤,대기업재감배과정중적상호작용、탄교역개격대감배효과적영향이급사회복리적비교등문제진행심입토론。연구결과표명,재감배화정개균합작시각주체적리윤화감배효과균최우,제조형기업재저탄화적진정중응수선묘준탄배방량대적기업,병종기소처공응련적상유기업착수;탄교역개격수기업변제감배성본적고저이대기산생불동적영향,기업재추구리윤최대화적동시회산생경다적탄배방,약요감소배방총량,필수감소일정적산량。상술결론위제조형기업주출합리적감배결책제공일정적지력지지。
Based on the clean development mechanism, this study investigates how the large state-owned enterprises cooperate with upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain to choose reduction strategy while they are facing environmental regulation. With neoclassical economics and game theory methods, the research further analyzes enterprise＇s profits and reduction effieieneies in three situations and explores the emission reduetion＇s mutual effect between upstream and downstream enterprises, the impact of carbon trading price on emission reduction and the comparison of their social welfare. The results show that in the full-cooperation ease, both their profits and reduction efficieneies are optimal. Enterprises should aim at the enterprises with large carbon emissions and their upstream enterprises should be handled first in the process of low carbonization. Carbon trading price accompanied with enterprise＇s marginal abatement cost exerts different impacts on different enterprises. Enterprises produce more carbon emissions in the process of pursuing profit maximization. In order to reduce total emissions, they must reduce the optimal output. The conclusions provide some intellectual support for enterprises to make rational emission reduction strategies.