CAJ | 학술논문

订单农业履约率低的重要原因在于公司和农户的利益分配关系没有处理好。采用供应链一般序贯博弈中的旁支付契约设计方法,建立＂保底收购＋随行就市＋利润返还＂的旁支付激励机制。通过改变公司与农户的支付函数,使得二者仍然执行两阶段动态博弈的分散决策,子博弈精炼纳什均衡解却与集中决策下的Pareto均衡解一致,并运用Rubinstein-Stahl轮流出价的讨价还价模型对系统的利润增量进行分配。研究表明：＂保底收购＋随行就市＋利润返还＂机制具有一定的合理性和可行性,公司、农户和供应链系统都实现了Pareto改进,实现了对增量利润的合理分配,有利于提高订单农业的履约率。
정단농업리약솔저적중요원인재우공사화농호적이익분배관계몰유처리호。채용공응련일반서관박혁중적방지부계약설계방법,건립＂보저수구＋수행취시＋리윤반환＂적방지부격려궤제。통과개변공사여농호적지부함수,사득이자잉연집행량계단동태박혁적분산결책,자박혁정련납십균형해각여집중결책하적Pareto균형해일치,병운용Rubinstein-Stahl륜류출개적토개환개모형대계통적리윤증량진행분배。연구표명：＂보저수구＋수행취시＋리윤반환＂궤제구유일정적합이성화가행성,공사、농호화공응련계통도실현료Pareto개진,실현료대증량리윤적합리분배,유리우제고정단농업적리약솔。
One of the causes for the low-fulfillment rate of contract-farming lies in the poor allocation of benefits between company and farmer.This research builds a side payment incentive mechanism of ＂buying at price floor,following the market,profit returns＂ by the method of side payment contract design in supply chain sequential game.By changing the paying function of company and farmer,both sides practise two phases of dynamic game to decentralize decision,while subgame perfect Nash equilibrium has the same solutions with Pareto equilibrium.It uses the bargain model of Rubinstein-Stah1 bid in turn to allocate incremental profit within the system.The study shows： the mechanism that ＂buying at price floor,following the market,profit returns＂ is rational and practical,which helps to improve the company,farmer and supply chain as well as Pareto while realizing the rational allocation of incremental profit,and improving the compliance rate of contract-farming.