CAJ | 학술논문

运用演化博弈理论，建立在政府支持下的不同地区非对称物流企业合作的演化博弈模型，通过对比研究政府支持对合作演化博弈稳定策略的变化，并判断合作策略的演化稳定性，以确定政府支持对非对称物流企业合作的影响。实证研究表明，政府的支持可以以较小的成本获得较大的收益，一方面可以加强物流企业合作的意愿．促进并加快“坚持合作”策略成为演化稳定策略的演化进程；另一方面可以实现在自然状态下的演化稳定策略由“中途背叛”转变为“坚持合作”，即提高物流企业选择“坚持合作”策略的可能性。
운용연화박혁이론，건립재정부지지하적불동지구비대칭물류기업합작적연화박혁모형，통과대비연구정부지지대합작연화박혁은정책략적변화，병판단합작책략적연화은정성，이학정정부지지대비대칭물류기업합작적영향。실증연구표명，정부적지지가이이교소적성본획득교대적수익，일방면가이가강물류기업합작적의원．촉진병가쾌“견지합작”책략성위연화은정책략적연화진정；령일방면가이실현재자연상태하적연화은정책략유“중도배반”전변위“견지합작”，즉제고물류기업선택“견지합작”책략적가능성。
This paper constructs a co-operational evolution game model of asyrmnetric logistics enter-prises in different areas, studies the changes of governmental support on strategetic stability of co-oper-ational evolution game model, estimates the evolutional stability of co-operational strategy, and thus figures out the influence of governmental support on the cooperation among asymmetric logistics enter- prises. The empirical research shows that governmental support can achieve more benefits by less costs in that, on the one hand, it can strengthen the cooperation will of different logistic enterprises, pro- mote and accelerate the transformation process from ＂adhering to cooperation＂ to ＂keeping co-opera-tional stability＂, and on the other hand, effectively avoid the occurrence of breach of contract and faith, and increase the possibility of cooperation among logistics enterprises.