CAJ | 학술논문

由于对企业是否履行CSR（Corporate Social Responsibility）行为进行监督需要可观的监督成本，且对政府来说，严格的监督还可能对短期内GDP政绩指标表现造成不利影响。因此，在缺乏媒体监督的社会环境中，政府和核心企业都有不采取措施监督供应链成员履行CSR的动机。针对这一现实问题，可运用进化博弈理论，在前人研究基础上引入GDP政绩和媒体监督的环境因素，构建政府和核心企业CSR监督的进化博弈模型，对彼此博弈策略的稳定性进行分析。研究表明：政府和核心企业对供应链成员的CSR行为是否进行监督一方面取决于监督成本、公众的CSR意识、GDP政绩指标权重以及社会媒体的监督力量等因素，另一方面也与博弈对手的策略选择的概率相关。
유우대기업시부리행CSR（Corporate Social Responsibility）행위진행감독수요가관적감독성본，차대정부래설，엄격적감독환가능대단기내GDP정적지표표현조성불리영향。인차，재결핍매체감독적사회배경중，정부화핵심기업도유불채취조시감독공응련성원리행CSR적동궤。침대저일현실문제，가운용진화박혁이론，재전인연구기출상인입GDP정적화매체감독적배경인소，구건정부화핵심기업CSR감독적진화박혁모형，대피차박혁책략적은정성진행분석。연구표명：정부화핵심기업대공응련성원적CSR행위시부진행감독일방면취결우감독성본、공음적CSR의식、GDP정적지표권중이급사회매체적감독역량등인소，령일방면야여박혁대수적책략선택적개솔상관。
It is costy to monitor whether supply chain member practice CSR and the supervision requires extra costs for government and strict supervision may also adversely affect GDP perfor-mance indicators in the short term. Therefore, in an environment which lacks necessary media su-pervision, both government and core-business have no strong intention in taking steps to supervise whether the supply chain members are practicing CSR. To solve this problem, we propose an evolutionary game model which takes factors of GDP performance and media supervision into ac- count on the basis of predecessors＇ study and analyzes the evolutionary stability of the game strategies. As is shown, whether government and core-enterprises carrying out their monitor re-sponsibility rests with, on the one hand, supervision cost, public awareness of CSR, weights of indicators of GDP performance and the power of social media, and on the other, the strategy probabilities of the opposite side in the game.