CAJ | 학술논문

控制权收购可分为一次性收购和循序收购两种模式。文章认为循序收购可被归结为防御机制，这种防御机制旨在发现和约束那些可能对中小股东构成利益侵夺的收购方。文章在对1998-2006年中国A股市场发生的民营企业作为收购方的上市公司控制权收购案例进行研究后，发现具有潜在利益侵夺倾向的收购方更有可能选择循序收购而非一次性收购。这一发现将对公司治理中控股股东与其他中小股东利益冲突的研究从事后阶段推向了事前阶段。
공제권수구가분위일차성수구화순서수구량충모식。문장인위순서수구가피귀결위방어궤제，저충방어궤제지재발현화약속나사가능대중소고동구성이익침탈적수구방。문장재대1998-2006년중국A고시장발생적민영기업작위수구방적상시공사공제권수구안례진행연구후，발현구유잠재이익침탈경향적수구방경유가능선택순서수구이비일차성수구。저일발현장대공사치리중공고고동여기타중소고동이익충돌적연구종사후계단추향료사전계단。
The acquisition of corporate control can he classified into one-time and sequen- tial acquisition modes. This paper takes sequential acquisition as a defense mechanism aiming to detect and discipline the potential acquirers expropriating the minority shareholders. This paper makes an empirical study of acquisition cases of corporate control with regard to ac- quirers in the Chinese A-share market from 2001 to 2006, and arrives at the conclusion that acquirers with potential tendency to expropriate the minority shareholders are more likely to choose a sequential acquisition mode rather than a one-time acquisition mode. This conclu- sion changes the research on principal-principal agency conflicts in corporate governance from ex post stage to ex ante stage.