CAJ | 학술논문

有关“风险承担”（risk taking）的研究是近年来特别是全球金融危机背景下财务学研究的热点问题之一。本文研究结果表明：（1）货币薪酬激励的增加能提升高管承担风险的水平；（2）最终控制人性质和公司成长性会影响两者之间的关系，在国有企业以及公司成长性较低的公司，货币薪酬激励与风险承担之间的正相关关系较弱；（3）风险承担水平的提高能促进公司绩效的提升；（4）进一步研究发现，风险承担在高管薪酬激励与企业绩效之间发挥中介效用作用。这些结论在采用两阶段最小二乘法（2SLS）和三阶段最小二乘法（3SLS）处理内生性问题等稳健性测试后依然成立。因此，本文从“风险承担”这一新的视角深化了有关高管薪酬激励降低代理问题并提升公司绩效的研究，也为中国上市公司尤其是国有上市公司高管薪酬契约设计的有效性提供了借鉴和参考价值。
유관“풍험승담”（risk taking）적연구시근년래특별시전구금융위궤배경하재무학연구적열점문제지일。본문연구결과표명：（1）화폐신수격려적증가능제승고관승담풍험적수평；（2）최종공제인성질화공사성장성회영향량자지간적관계，재국유기업이급공사성장성교저적공사，화폐신수격려여풍험승담지간적정상관관계교약；（3）풍험승담수평적제고능촉진공사적효적제승；（4）진일보연구발현，풍험승담재고관신수격려여기업적효지간발휘중개효용작용。저사결론재채용량계단최소이승법（2SLS）화삼계단최소이승법（3SLS）처리내생성문제등은건성측시후의연성립。인차，본문종“풍험승담”저일신적시각심화료유관고관신수격려강저대리문제병제승공사적효적연구，야위중국상시공사우기시국유상시공사고관신수계약설계적유효성제공료차감화삼고개치。
The study on risk-taking is a hot issue in finance recently, especially after the global finan- cial crisis. Our empirical results show that, first, the increase of managerial incentives can improve corpo- rate risk taking. Second, the nature of ultimate controlling shareholder and sales growth do influence this relation. In SOEs and firm with low sales growth, the positive relation between managerial incentives and risk taking is weaker. Third, the increase of risk taking can improve firm performance. Finally, we find risk-taking plays a mediation role in the relation between managerial incentives and firm performance. Our results are robust after using 2SLS and 3SLS to deal with the endogeneity problem. Therefore, we extend the research on the relation between managerial incentives and firm performance from the new perspective of risk taking, and our results have important implications for the design of manager＇s compensation con- tract of listing firms in China, especially for the SOEs.