CAJ | 학술논문

针对现实生活中存在的盗版产品与正版产品可能同质同价的问题，运用博弈论优化方法，建立了由正版厂商、盗版厂商和政府组成的信息产品市场的两阶段Stackelberg产量博弈模型，分析了正版厂商采取不同反复制策略时的市场均衡情况，以及社会福利最大化目标下政府的最优监管政策和正版厂商的策略选择。研究表明，正版厂商和政府在反盗版力量配置上存在此消彼长的博弈关系：当正版厂商采取强硬态度阻止盗版厂商的复制和进入时，政府将搭便车，放松或放弃监管；当正版厂商对盗版采取适度容忍态度时，政府将主动加强监管。作为正版厂商，采取主动的反复制策略总是有利的。政府应鼓励正版厂商积极提高反复制技术水平，并加强与企业的合作，共同打击盗版。
침대현실생활중존재적도판산품여정판산품가능동질동개적문제，운용박혁론우화방법，건립료유정판엄상、도판엄상화정부조성적신식산품시장적량계단Stackelberg산량박혁모형，분석료정판엄상채취불동반복제책략시적시장균형정황，이급사회복리최대화목표하정부적최우감관정책화정판엄상적책략선택。연구표명，정판엄상화정부재반도판역량배치상존재차소피장적박혁관계：당정판엄상채취강경태도조지도판엄상적복제화진입시，정부장탑편차，방송혹방기감관；당정판엄상대도판채취괄도용인태도시，정부장주동가강감관。작위정판엄상，채취주동적반복제책략총시유리적。정부응고려정판엄상적겁제고반복제기술수평，병가강여기업적합작，공동타격도판。
Aiming at the problem that pirate products may have the same quality and prices with the genuine products in real life, this paper uses the optimization method of the game theory to establish a two - stage Staekelberg output game model composed of the genuine manufacturer, the pirate manufacturer and the government in the information market, analyzes the market equilibri- ums when the genuine manufacturer adopts different anti - replication strategies, and studies the government＇ s optimal supervi- sion policy and the genuine manufacturer＇ s strategy choice under the circumstances where the social welfare is maximized. The research indicates that the relationship between the genuine manufacturer and government＇ s anti - piracy efforts is like a game, in which when the genuine manufacturer toughly prevents the pirate manufacturer from entering the market, the government will choose to free - ride or slacken the supervision, but when the genuine manufacturer chooses to tolerate the pirate action moderate- ly, the government will actively strengthen the supervision. As a genuine manufacturer, it is always beneficial to take the anti - replication strategy. And the government should encourage genuine manufacturers to reinforce their anti - replication technology and strengthen their cooperation with the genuine manufacturer to fight against piracy.