生态经济
生態經濟
생태경제
Ecological Economy
2013年
9期
58~60
,共null页
碳排放权价格 动态博弈 策略
碳排放權價格 動態博弈 策略
탄배방권개격 동태박혁 책략
prices of carbon emission rights; dynamic game; strategies
运用罗宾斯泰英的轮流叫价谈判模型对碳排放权价格的形成进行分析，得出如下结论：碳排放权价格的唯一子博弈精炼纳什均衡结果取决于碳排放权买卖双方的耐心程度。而耐心程度取决于碳排放权的相对稀缺程度、流动性、碳排放权交易达不成时买卖双方的损失、碳排放权买卖双方的实力。在此基础上，探讨改善我国碳排放权价格劣势地位的策略。
運用囉賓斯泰英的輪流叫價談判模型對碳排放權價格的形成進行分析，得齣如下結論：碳排放權價格的唯一子博弈精煉納什均衡結果取決于碳排放權買賣雙方的耐心程度。而耐心程度取決于碳排放權的相對稀缺程度、流動性、碳排放權交易達不成時買賣雙方的損失、碳排放權買賣雙方的實力。在此基礎上，探討改善我國碳排放權價格劣勢地位的策略。
운용라빈사태영적륜류규개담판모형대탄배방권개격적형성진행분석，득출여하결론：탄배방권개격적유일자박혁정련납십균형결과취결우탄배방권매매쌍방적내심정도。이내심정도취결우탄배방권적상대희결정도、류동성、탄배방권교역체불성시매매쌍방적손실、탄배방권매매쌍방적실력。재차기출상，탐토개선아국탄배방권개격열세지위적책략。
This paper analyss the formation of prices of carbon emission rights, applying Rubinstein＇s turns bid negotiation model, and draws the following conclusions： only subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of carbon emission rights prices depends on the patience degree of seller and buyer of the carbon emissions rights. The patience degree depends on the relative scarcity of carbon emission rights, liquidity, loss of buyer and seller when carbon emissions trading fail, the strength of buyer and seller of carbon emission rights. On this basis, the paper discussed strategies to improve disadvantage of our carbon emission rights price.
