西部论坛
西部論罈
서부론단
West Forum
2013年
4期
11~20
,共null页
农产品交易 平稳关系契约 可自我实施最优契约 专用投资 事前保留收益 事后保留收益 单步激励计划 道德风险
農產品交易 平穩關繫契約 可自我實施最優契約 專用投資 事前保留收益 事後保留收益 單步激勵計劃 道德風險
농산품교역 평은관계계약 가자아실시최우계약 전용투자 사전보류수익 사후보류수익 단보격려계화 도덕풍험
agricultural products trading; stationary relational contract; self-enforcing optimal contract; specific investment; ex-post kept return; ex-post kept return; single-step incentive plan; morality risk
龙头企业与农户间的农产品交易本质上属于长期合作关系,双方有效合作的基础是能够为合作双方提供长期有效的激励、降低违约风险的可自我实施契约。在界定农产品交易平稳关系契约的基础上,对在农户存在专用投资、龙头企业具有全部事后谈判力量的情形下,农产品交易最优平稳关系契约的可能形式进行分析,结论表明:最优平稳关系契约形式与双方的贴现因子、双方持续合作的概率、农户的事前和事后保留收益有关;最优的激励计划严格依赖于龙头企业承诺向农户的支付与农户的事前保留效用及事后保留效用之间的对比关系,这种对比关系使农产品交易关系契约的运行效率不再与剩余分配状况相关。
龍頭企業與農戶間的農產品交易本質上屬于長期閤作關繫,雙方有效閤作的基礎是能夠為閤作雙方提供長期有效的激勵、降低違約風險的可自我實施契約。在界定農產品交易平穩關繫契約的基礎上,對在農戶存在專用投資、龍頭企業具有全部事後談判力量的情形下,農產品交易最優平穩關繫契約的可能形式進行分析,結論錶明:最優平穩關繫契約形式與雙方的貼現因子、雙方持續閤作的概率、農戶的事前和事後保留收益有關;最優的激勵計劃嚴格依賴于龍頭企業承諾嚮農戶的支付與農戶的事前保留效用及事後保留效用之間的對比關繫,這種對比關繫使農產品交易關繫契約的運行效率不再與剩餘分配狀況相關。
룡두기업여농호간적농산품교역본질상속우장기합작관계,쌍방유효합작적기출시능구위합작쌍방제공장기유효적격려、강저위약풍험적가자아실시계약。재계정농산품교역평은관계계약적기출상,대재농호존재전용투자、룡두기업구유전부사후담판역량적정형하,농산품교역최우평은관계계약적가능형식진행분석,결론표명:최우평은관계계약형식여쌍방적첩현인자、쌍방지속합작적개솔、농호적사전화사후보류수익유관;최우적격려계화엄격의뢰우룡두기업승낙향농호적지부여농호적사전보류효용급사후보류효용지간적대비관계,저충대비관계사농산품교역관계계약적운행효솔불재여잉여분배상황상관。
Agricultural commodities trading between leading enterprise and farmers is essentially a long-term cooperation relationship,the effective cooperation basis between the two parties is self-enforcing contract for long-term effective encouragement and default risk reduction.Based on the definition of stationary relational contract of agricultural products trading,under the situation of the existence of specific investment of farmers and leading enterprises having all ex-post negotiation capacity,the possible form of optimal stationary relational contract of agricultural products trading is analyzed,and the conclusion indicates that the optimal stationary relational contract form is related to discount factor of the two parties,the probability of continuous cooperation of the two parties,and the ex-ante and ex-post kept return of the farmers,that the optimal incentive plan is strictly depending on the payment to the farmers by the leading enterprises and the contrast relation between ex-ante kept return utility and ex-post kept return utility and that this contrast relation makes the operation efficiency of relational contract of agricultural products trading not related to surplus return distribution situation any more.