CAJ | 학술논문

以2008-2011年度我国沪深两市的A股上市公司为对象,从管理层权力视角考察薪酬激励与盈余管理问题的内在联系。研究发现：在全流通时代公司完全有可能诱使管理层为满足激励函数而操纵会计盈余,以实现股票期权收益;在薪酬业绩挂钩的激励机制下,管理层权力大的公司其盈余管理行为更加明显,说明管理层权力的大小确实能够影响企业的盈余管理行为。同时,从公司和监管层的角度分别提出建立更为合理的与业绩挂钩的长效薪酬管理体系和进一步完善强制性高管薪酬披露制度等相关建议。
이2008-2011년도아국호심량시적A고상시공사위대상,종관리층권력시각고찰신수격려여영여관리문제적내재련계。연구발현：재전류통시대공사완전유가능유사관리층위만족격려함수이조종회계영여,이실현고표기권수익;재신수업적괘구적격려궤제하,관리층권력대적공사기영여관리행위경가명현,설명관리층권력적대소학실능구영향기업적영여관리행위。동시,종공사화감관층적각도분별제출건립경위합리적여업적괘구적장효신수관리체계화진일보완선강제성고관신수피로제도등상관건의。
This paper studies the underlying relationship between remuneration schemes and earnings management from the managerial power perspective under complete circulation.These data are based on China’s listed companies from 2008 2010.This paper finds that the executive compensation and the percentage of CEO’ stock option is significantly positive to DTAC.It reveals that it is possible for the executives to be allured to manipulate earnings in order to satisfy the motivation function and achieve income from stock option.At the same time,the paper finds that managerial power is also significantly positive to DTAC,which shows the level of managerial power could truly influence these companies’ earnings management behavior.Finally,the paper puts forward some suggestions to modify the executive compensation schemes from the company’s and government’s point of view.