CAJ | 학술논문

本文基于世界银行在中国23个大中城市的企业调查数据，首次实证研究了我国中小微企业银企关系特征对企业贷款抵押设定的影响。研究表明，我国中小微企业银企关系特征是贷款抵押决策的重要影响因素，单一的银企关系将有助于降低中小微企业的抵押成本，但同时长期密切的关系也会给企业带来更高的融资成本，使企业面临被商业银行“套牢”的风险。本文研究的政策含义在于，要切实降低中小微企业的相关贷款成本，不能仅仅依靠银企之间的密切合作，通过政府及有关部门的制度安排来改善融资环境将更为重要。
본문기우세계은행재중국23개대중성시적기업조사수거，수차실증연구료아국중소미기업은기관계특정대기업대관저압설정적영향。연구표명，아국중소미기업은기관계특정시대관저압결책적중요영향인소，단일적은기관계장유조우강저중소미기업적저압성본，단동시장기밀절적관계야회급기업대래경고적융자성본，사기업면림피상업은행“투뢰”적풍험。본문연구적정책함의재우，요절실강저중소미기업적상관대관성본，불능부부의고은기지간적밀절합작，통과정부급유관부문적제도안배래개선융자배경장경위중요。
In lending agreements, collateral is a borrower＇s pledge of specific property to a lender, to secure repayment of a loan. The collateral serves as protection for a lender against a borrower＇s default when any borrower failing to pay the principal and interest under the terms of a loan obligation. If a borrower does default on a loan, she will forfeit the property pledged as collateral, and the lender then becomes the owner of the collateral. The relationship between firms and banks often suffers from informational opacity whieb may result in credit rationing. In theory, providing collateral to the bank can have a mitigating effect on these informational asymmetries and thus solve the credit rationing problem. However, from point of the borrower angle, when she provides collateral to the bank, especially with the enterprise operational assets as mortgage, the production and business operation activities of enterprise will be seriously affected. In the collateral process of assets evaluation,registration and notarization, not only the enterprise＇s non-operating expenses will involved, but also the other financing costs will greatly increased. In China, because large amounts of Micro, small and medium enterprises （MSMEs）are young, small, weak and risky ones, commercial banks usually ask them providing more collateral compared with other big companies when they apply for loans. ＂Too expensive for financing＂ problem is more outstanding for the MSMEs. Under this background ,we try to answer these questions： can the MSMEs decrease the cost of the loan by establishing or maintaining a specific form of firm-bank relationship in our country？ Or at the same time the close relationship will bring more opportunities to create ＂rent＂ for the bank？ In this paper these problems will be revealed through the empirical research. Using the World Bank enterprises survey data from 23 domestic large and medium-sized cities in China, this paper firstly investigates empirically how the firm-bank relationship characteristics affect the MSMEs loan collateral use. Our results show that the MSMEs-bank relationship characteristics are important influence factors on loan coluse ilateral n China, single banking relationship will help lower MSMEs＂ collateral cost. The result has a certain significance for the MSMEs financing decision on ＂how to establish a special relationship between firms and banks in order to reduce the financing cost＂ in practice, it also provides a new evidence on the application value of the relationship lending research in theory. On the other hand, we also notice that long-term close firm-bank relationship will also bring ＂hold-up＂ risk to the MSMEs caused by the commercial banks in China, a large number of related empirical studies abroad confirm it in the past. We find that in our country when the MSMEs deal with the commercial banks, they often suffer from discrimination and inequality, facing the other party＇s dominant market position. This kind of situation makes the value of firm-bank relationship be more inclined to commercial banks, rather than the MSMEs. We think it is difficult to solve this problem only relying on the MSMEs＂ own resources. We may need more institutional arrangements by the government and relevant departments to improve the existing financing environment and perfect the running mechanism and credit system of the commercial banks. For example, based on the experience of the United States, Japan and other countries, the government can set up a non-profit foundation to provide guarantee for the MSMEs,thus resolving the problem of high cost mortgages of enterprises;the government can build a MSMEs ＂credit information-sharing platform which will effectively restrain the commercial banks information monopoly rents;the government can subsidize interest payments for bank loans to the MSMEs which will reduce the cost of bank bad debts ; then, the government can levy half or no business taxes on all MSMEs loan business of commercial banks, or can improve the tolerance of bad loans of the aforementioned loan business, which will be better able to arouse the enthusiasm of the Chinese commercial banks for providing financial service to the MSMEs, and so on. Only under such an institutional environment protection system, the MSMEs＂＂Too expensive for financing＂ problem can get a better solution.