CAJ | 학술논문

不断强化上市公司高管薪酬信息披露，增强高管薪酬激励透明度，一直被视为提升企业高管薪酬治理效率的重要途径。本文以2007—2011年我国A股上市公司为样本，从代理成本角度研究了企业管理层实施高管薪酬自愿性披露的动机和策略。实证研究发现：（1）企业高管获取的货币性私有收益越高，管理层自愿披露更多但相关性不高的高管货币性薪酬信息；（2）企业高管获取的货币性私有收益越高，管理层自愿披露高管在职消费信息的程度就越低；（3）企业高管货币性私有收益与高管薪酬自愿性披露的显著相关性主要存在于国有控股企业中。上述发现表明，国有企业管理层攫取货币性私有收益后，企业高管薪酬自愿性披露存在明显的信息操纵。
불단강화상시공사고관신수신식피로，증강고관신수격려투명도，일직피시위제승기업고관신수치리효솔적중요도경。본문이2007—2011년아국A고상시공사위양본，종대리성본각도연구료기업관리층실시고관신수자원성피로적동궤화책략。실증연구발현：（1）기업고관획취적화폐성사유수익월고，관리층자원피로경다단상관성불고적고관화폐성신수신식；（2）기업고관획취적화폐성사유수익월고，관리층자원피로고관재직소비신식적정도취월저；（3）기업고관화폐성사유수익여고관신수자원성피로적현저상관성주요존재우국유공고기업중。상술발현표명，국유기업관리층확취화폐성사유수익후，기업고관신수자원성피로존재명현적신식조종。
Managerial power theory points out that in order to avoid the outrage cost from corporate stakeholders, the top managers of the listed companies often camouflage the overpaid compensation seized by taking advantage of their own power. As a result, to strengthen the disclosure of executive compensation and improve the transparency of top managers＇ pay incentives has long been recognized as an important way to enhancing top managers＇ pay governance efficiency. Based on 2007 -- 2011 data of Chinese A-Share listed companies, we investigate the impact of top managers＇ pecuniary private benefits derived from rent-seeking on the degree of their voluntary disclosures of executive compensation, We find that：（1）Top managers＇ pecuniary private benefits have a significant positive effect on the extent of voluntary disclosures of executive compensation, but these seemingly sufficient compensation disclo- sures generally lack relevance. （2） There is a significant negative correlation between top managers＇ pecuniary private benefits and the degree of voluntary disclosures of executive perks. （3） Those above-mentioned relationships mainly exist in state-controlled listed companies; In non-state-controlled firms, top managers＇ pecuniary private benefits have no such effects. These findings suggest that there exist apparent information manipulations in voluntary disclosure of executive compensation in state-controlled listed companies. The main policy implications from this research are as follows. First, to enhance the relevance of executive compensation disclosure and improve the transparency of top managers＇ pay in- centives, the government should implement stricter mandatory disclosure rules regarding executive compensation of listed firms. Second, by improving the corporate governance and strengthening the independence of corporate board of state-controlled listed firms, the procedural justice and outcome justice of executive compensation pay-setting should be realized so as to eliminate the pay-justifying motives of top managers in the voluntary disclosure of executive compensation. Last, but not the least, the non-controlled shareholders should be allowed effectively to participate in the governance of executive compensation pay-setting process.