CAJ | 학술논문

基于博弈论思想，通过对政府官员和纪检人员两个博弈方的静、动态博弈分析，求得两个博弈方的最优策略组合：只有给予纪检人员更高的激励以及降低其反腐成本才能更有效地激励反腐，同时应加大官员犯罪成本。而通过构建博弈模型分析官员互相监督机制在反腐败中的作用，可以预期，在目前没有实现高薪养廉的情况下，将官员反腐与职位升迁相挂钩，能够促进官员互相监督机制的形成，逐渐构建起完善的反腐机制。
기우박혁론사상，통과대정부관원화기검인원량개박혁방적정、동태박혁분석，구득량개박혁방적최우책략조합：지유급여기검인원경고적격려이급강저기반부성본재능경유효지격려반부，동시응가대관원범죄성본。이통과구건박혁모형분석관원호상감독궤제재반부패중적작용，가이예기，재목전몰유실현고신양렴적정황하，장관원반부여직위승천상괘구，능구촉진관원호상감독궤제적형성，축점구건기완선적반부궤제。
Based on the Game Theory, this article finds the optimal strategy combination of the government of-ficials and inspectors through static and dynamic analysis of these two game parties. Only when the inspectors are strongly encouraged and the cost of anti - corruption is reduced may the anti - corruption be effectively carried out. The cost of official crimes should be increased. By constructing the game models to analyze the functions of the mu-tual supervision in the anti - corruption, this article suggests that when high salaries are not offered, the anti - cor-ruption may be linked to the promotion of the officials, so as to facilitate the formation of the mutual supervision mechanism, and a perfect anti-corruption mechanism will be built up in the long term.