经济研究
經濟研究
경제연구
Economic Research Journal
2013年
8期
94~106
,共null页
企业承诺 消费者选择 质量 理性预期均衡 企业社会责任
企業承諾 消費者選擇 質量 理性預期均衡 企業社會責任
기업승낙 소비자선택 질량 이성예기균형 기업사회책임
Commitment ; Consumer Choice ; Quality; Rational Expectations Equilibrium ; Corporate Social Responsibility
本文以企业社会责任为切入点,在离散选择与理性预期均衡的框架下,研究企业承担社会责任对生产商质量水平投入决策的影响机理与演化路径,探讨企业承诺与消费者选择、生产商的质量投入水平决策的关系。本文的研究表明:当缺乏最基本的价格一致性承诺与表现为质量一致性承诺的企业社会责任约束时,消费者理性选择的结果会导致生产商的质量投入水平较低;当生产商能够保持价格一致性承诺时,产品的质量水平会得到有限的改善;当生产商同时保持价格和质量一致性承诺时,消费者的选择行为会促使市场达到质价相符、质量水平提升的均衡状态。本文还结合我国食品、药品等行业面临的实际情况,分析不同类型的质量保证机制的差异。研究表明,虽然企业主动承诺是更优的质量保证机制,但是在失信行为普遍的情形下,引入严厉的质量监督机制必不可少。
本文以企業社會責任為切入點,在離散選擇與理性預期均衡的框架下,研究企業承擔社會責任對生產商質量水平投入決策的影響機理與縯化路徑,探討企業承諾與消費者選擇、生產商的質量投入水平決策的關繫。本文的研究錶明:噹缺乏最基本的價格一緻性承諾與錶現為質量一緻性承諾的企業社會責任約束時,消費者理性選擇的結果會導緻生產商的質量投入水平較低;噹生產商能夠保持價格一緻性承諾時,產品的質量水平會得到有限的改善;噹生產商同時保持價格和質量一緻性承諾時,消費者的選擇行為會促使市場達到質價相符、質量水平提升的均衡狀態。本文還結閤我國食品、藥品等行業麵臨的實際情況,分析不同類型的質量保證機製的差異。研究錶明,雖然企業主動承諾是更優的質量保證機製,但是在失信行為普遍的情形下,引入嚴厲的質量鑑督機製必不可少。
본문이기업사회책임위절입점,재리산선택여이성예기균형적광가하,연구기업승담사회책임대생산상질량수평투입결책적영향궤리여연화로경,탐토기업승낙여소비자선택、생산상적질량투입수평결책적관계。본문적연구표명:당결핍최기본적개격일치성승낙여표현위질량일치성승낙적기업사회책임약속시,소비자이성선택적결과회도치생산상적질량투입수평교저;당생산상능구보지개격일치성승낙시,산품적질량수평회득도유한적개선;당생산상동시보지개격화질량일치성승낙시,소비자적선택행위회촉사시장체도질개상부、질량수평제승적균형상태。본문환결합아국식품、약품등행업면림적실제정황,분석불동류형적질량보증궤제적차이。연구표명,수연기업주동승낙시경우적질량보증궤제,단시재실신행위보편적정형하,인입엄려적질량감독궤제필불가소。
We study the impact of corporate social responsibility on a producer's quality investment decision and its evolution path by employing a discrete choice and rational expectations equilibrium framework. We analyze the relationship among commitment, consumer choice and producer's quality investment decision. We show that without the basic price-consistency commitment and the corporate social responslbihty constraint defined as quality-eonsistency commitment, a consumer's rational consumption choice will lead to a low quality level. The quality level will be improved only limitedly when the producer keeps the price-consistency commitment whereas with both price- and quality-consistency commitment the consumer's choice behavior will drive the market to achieve an equilibrium of quality-price-consistency and the quality will be improved to be sufficiently high. We also discuss the different mechanisms of quality guarantee regarding the real practice of food and pharmaceutical industry in China. We show that although a company's self-commitment will be a better choice for quality guarantee, the government may still need to have strict quality regulations when non-commitment prevails.