城市问题
城市問題
성시문제
Urban Problems
2013年
8期
78~82
,共null页
保障性住房 不诚信申请 演化博弈 复制动态方程 演化稳定策略
保障性住房 不誠信申請 縯化博弈 複製動態方程 縯化穩定策略
보장성주방 불성신신청 연화박혁 복제동태방정 연화은정책략
security housing;discredit application;evolution game;replication dynamic equation;evolutionary stable strategy
针对保障性住房申请过程中出现的不诚信申请问题,建立了审核部门与申请者之间的演化博弈模型,进而分析了两者的复制动态和演化博弈稳定策略,以及演化博弈系统的稳定性。结果表明,当申请者进行不诚信申请的收益大于不诚信申请的成本、政府部门对审核部门的奖罚力度不够且严格审核的成本过高时,不诚信申请必然出现。要确保不诚信申请的概率降低,就必须对保障性住房严格管理,对不诚信申请者进行严惩,在控制其预期收益的基础上提高成本,同时要加大对审核部门的监管及奖罚力度,加强审核队伍的建设。
針對保障性住房申請過程中齣現的不誠信申請問題,建立瞭審覈部門與申請者之間的縯化博弈模型,進而分析瞭兩者的複製動態和縯化博弈穩定策略,以及縯化博弈繫統的穩定性。結果錶明,噹申請者進行不誠信申請的收益大于不誠信申請的成本、政府部門對審覈部門的獎罰力度不夠且嚴格審覈的成本過高時,不誠信申請必然齣現。要確保不誠信申請的概率降低,就必鬚對保障性住房嚴格管理,對不誠信申請者進行嚴懲,在控製其預期收益的基礎上提高成本,同時要加大對審覈部門的鑑管及獎罰力度,加彊審覈隊伍的建設。
침대보장성주방신청과정중출현적불성신신청문제,건립료심핵부문여신청자지간적연화박혁모형,진이분석료량자적복제동태화연화박혁은정책략,이급연화박혁계통적은정성。결과표명,당신청자진행불성신신청적수익대우불성신신청적성본、정부부문대심핵부문적장벌력도불구차엄격심핵적성본과고시,불성신신청필연출현。요학보불성신신청적개솔강저,취필수대보장성주방엄격관리,대불성신신청자진행엄징,재공제기예기수익적기출상제고성본,동시요가대대심핵부문적감관급장벌력도,가강심핵대오적건설。
For the problem of discredit in the application progress of security housing,this essay builds an evolutionary game model between the audit department and the applicant,and analyzes the replicator dynamics and evolutionary stable strategy of both groups.The result shows that when the profit for discredit applicants is more than the cost;the cost of strictly audit is too high and governments’reward and punishment effort to the audit department is not enough,the discredit application is inevitable.To insure the probability of discredit application reduced,we must strictly manage the security housing;severely punish the discredit applicants;increase the cost on the basis of controlling the prospective earnings;and at the same time,strengthen the supervision,reward and punishment effort to the audit department;strengthen the construction of audit team.
