CAJ | 학술논문

前期基于应计项目操控的研究发现,国有控股、机构投资者有助于抑制盈余管理,从而有利于改善公司治理。目前,许多学者发现公司更倾向于实施真实活动的盈余管理,那么国有控股、机构投资者是否也有利于抑制真实活动的盈余管理？本文以中国上市公司为样本对这个问题进行了研究。结果发现,国有控股公司的真实盈余管理水平显著高于非国有公司;机构投资者能在一定程度上抑制公司的真实盈余管理行为,但国有公司的机构投资者对真实盈余管理的抑制作用显著小于非国有公司。上述结果表明,从真实盈余管理的角度来说,国有控股不利于公司治理;机构投资者能够改善公司治理,但其作用在国有公司中受到一定程度限制。本文的研究结论对已有的国有控股治理作用的文献是一个校正性的补充,对我国国有企业的治理和改革有一定程度的借鉴意义。
전기기우응계항목조공적연구발현,국유공고、궤구투자자유조우억제영여관리,종이유리우개선공사치리。목전,허다학자발현공사경경향우실시진실활동적영여관리,나요국유공고、궤구투자자시부야유리우억제진실활동적영여관리？본문이중국상시공사위양본대저개문제진행료연구。결과발현,국유공고공사적진실영여관리수평현저고우비국유공사;궤구투자자능재일정정도상억제공사적진실영여관리행위,단국유공사적궤구투자자대진실영여관리적억제작용현저소우비국유공사。상술결과표명,종진실영여관리적각도래설,국유공고불리우공사치리;궤구투자자능구개선공사치리,단기작용재국유공사중수도일정정도한제。본문적연구결론대이유적국유공고치리작용적문헌시일개교정성적보충,대아국국유기업적치리화개혁유일정정도적차감의의。
State-owned controlling and institutional ownership are important factors of corporate governance in China. Earnings management is an important manifestation of governance effect. Therefore, studying the relations among state-owned controlling, institutional investors, and earnings management is meaningful. The early literatures of earnings management on state-owned controlling and institutional investors are based on accruals earnings management. However, in recent years, many scholars find that firms tend to implement real earnings management. Do state-owned controlling and institutional ownership also affect real earnings management behavior？ No evidence is available to answer the research question. This paper＇s theoretical contribution is a new theoretical and empirical research development of real earnings management. The level of real earnings management is characterized by abnormal net cash flow from operations, abnormal production costs and discretionary expenses. In this paper, the models proposed by Barth, et al. （2008） and Cohen et al. （2008） are basic models. The samples are from 4, 953 companies in 10 industries from the years 2006 to 2009. From the perspective of real earnings management, this paper studies the governance effect of state-owned controlling and that of institutional investors, as well as different effects of institutional investors in state-owned firms and in non-stated firms. Finally, this study reveals that compared with private enterprises state-owned enterprises are more inclined to choose real earnings management for earnings manipulation. While the increase in the proportion of institutional ownership is in favor of inhibiting real earnings management of the enterprises, state-owned controlling enterprises will restrict the governance role of institutional ownership on real earnings management. In another word, with the increase in the proportion of institutional ownership the level of real earnings management in non-stated firms decreases more significantly than that in state-owned firms. From the perspective of real earnings management, state-owned controlling is not conducive to corporate governance. Institutional investors can improve corporate governance, but their roles are limited in state-owned firms. The conclusions of this study have both theoretical and practical significance. The findings of this study provide supplement to the existing study on the governance role of state- owned controlling. In practice, real earnings management activities would damage a company＇s long-term interests. Thus, we should actively push state-owned enterprises＇ reforms, such as pursuing equity reform, vigorously developing institutional investors, inhibiting the real earnings management, and improving corporate governance of state-owned enterprises.