管理工程学报
管理工程學報
관리공정학보
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
2013年
3期
87~92
,共null页
房地产 销售代理 承诺 回馈 惩罚
房地產 銷售代理 承諾 迴饋 懲罰
방지산 소수대리 승낙 회궤 징벌
real estate; sales agency; commitment; feedback; penalty
以普通佣金模式下房地产销售代理商的积极性不能得到有效发挥为切入点,对房地产销售代理承诺合约进行研究。作为研究基点,首先分析了普通佣金模式下销售代理商的工作努力程度以及整个销售供应链和委托代理双方各自的收益。随后,对销售数量承诺销售代理合约进行研究,在承诺合约模型中,引入单价奖惩加固定金额奖惩的综合奖惩措施,通过模型构建和优化分析,得出销售代理商的决策策略和收益。并对两种模式下销售代理商的努力程度和各方收益进行了对比分析,结果表明,承诺合约模式下,销售代理商的努力程度更高,项目产品的销售量更大,各方收益也更大。同时,研究表明单价奖惩加固定金额奖罚的综合奖惩措施比以往单纯的单价奖惩措施对系统更优,可以迫使销售代理商选择较高的努力程度,保证其承诺的实现,从而保证房地产开发商预定目标的实现。最后,通过数值算例对研究结论进行了验证和说明。
以普通傭金模式下房地產銷售代理商的積極性不能得到有效髮揮為切入點,對房地產銷售代理承諾閤約進行研究。作為研究基點,首先分析瞭普通傭金模式下銷售代理商的工作努力程度以及整箇銷售供應鏈和委託代理雙方各自的收益。隨後,對銷售數量承諾銷售代理閤約進行研究,在承諾閤約模型中,引入單價獎懲加固定金額獎懲的綜閤獎懲措施,通過模型構建和優化分析,得齣銷售代理商的決策策略和收益。併對兩種模式下銷售代理商的努力程度和各方收益進行瞭對比分析,結果錶明,承諾閤約模式下,銷售代理商的努力程度更高,項目產品的銷售量更大,各方收益也更大。同時,研究錶明單價獎懲加固定金額獎罰的綜閤獎懲措施比以往單純的單價獎懲措施對繫統更優,可以迫使銷售代理商選擇較高的努力程度,保證其承諾的實現,從而保證房地產開髮商預定目標的實現。最後,通過數值算例對研究結論進行瞭驗證和說明。
이보통용금모식하방지산소수대리상적적겁성불능득도유효발휘위절입점,대방지산소수대리승낙합약진행연구。작위연구기점,수선분석료보통용금모식하소수대리상적공작노력정도이급정개소수공응련화위탁대리쌍방각자적수익。수후,대소수수량승낙소수대리합약진행연구,재승낙합약모형중,인입단개장징가고정금액장징적종합장징조시,통과모형구건화우화분석,득출소수대리상적결책책략화수익。병대량충모식하소수대리상적노력정도화각방수익진행료대비분석,결과표명,승낙합약모식하,소수대리상적노력정도경고,항목산품적소수량경대,각방수익야경대。동시,연구표명단개장징가고정금액장벌적종합장징조시비이왕단순적단개장징조시대계통경우,가이박사소수대리상선택교고적노력정도,보증기승낙적실현,종이보증방지산개발상예정목표적실현。최후,통과수치산례대연구결론진행료험증화설명。
The sales are an important part of real estate development and they directly determine the profitability of real estate projects. For this reason, many real estate developers commission the experienced sales agents to do the sales work. Currently, reM estate sales agents generally use the commission mode. In this mode, the supply and sales chain of real estate cannot have high operational efficiency. On the other hand, in order to maintain the normal operation of the capital chain of real estate companies developers have a strong demand for capital recovery of projects. To this end, there is an urgent need to design a reasonable sales agency agreement in order to improve the operational efficiency of the supply and sales chain of real estate, and achieve the sales goal of real estate developers. Therefore, real estate sales agencies usually cannot be stimulated effectively in the common commission mode as the starting point. In this article, we constructed the common commission mode and the commitment contract mode, and then optimized and analyzed these modes. In order to investigate the typical characteristics of real estate sales agent commitment contracts, and consider the actual situation of the problem, this paper assume the following conditions in the model construction: ( 1 ) the salable area of real estate projects is certain and can not be changed with the change of the sales price and demand, and (2) developers and sales agents are on unequal bargaining positions. The framework and principal terms of the sales agent contract are proposed for developers. The sales agents can negotiate and bargain with developers in response to the developers' principal terms. Firstly, this article analyzes the work efforts of sales agencies and the proceeds of the entire supply chain and the agencies. Subsequently, this article studies the sales agency commitment contract. In the commitment contract mode, after considering the efficiency of supply chain operations of real estate sales, a comprehensive rewards and penalties measures are introduced in order to ensure the stage sales goals of sales developers. Then, through the model construction and optimization analysis of the two contract models, we respectively got the different work effort of sale agents and the proceeds of sales and supply chain and agents. On this basis, we carry a comparative analysis between the two contract models. The results show that in the commitment contract mode the sales agent's work effort is higher than that in the ordinary commission mode, and its level of effort and the sales amount are in positively correlation with the commission. In the commitment contract model,the sales amount of products is bigger than that in the ordinary commission mode, and the overall proceeds of the real estate sales and supply chain, developers and the sales agents are higher t?o. The study also finds that in the commitment contract mode the sales agents concerned with their own interests are likely to choose a lower work effort if only simple unit price incentive measures are applied without fixed amount incentive measures. In this case, commitment will not be realized and pre-sales target for real estate developers cannot be achieved. However, the unit price incentive measures plus fixed amount incentive measures can ensure that sales agents take adequate actions to ensure the implementation of its commitments. Finally, according to the actual condition and assumption we change the relevant parameters and get the results of each situation. The calculations and cases show that the findings of this paper are effective.